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The sharing economy is a new industrial structure that is 
made possible by instantaneous internet communication and 
changes in the life, work, and purchasing habits of individual 
entrepreneurs and consumers. Antitrust law is an economic 
regulatory scheme dating back to 1890 in the United States 
that is designed to address centrally controlled concentrations 
of economic power and the threats that those concentrations 
pose to consumer interests and economic efficiency. In order to 
accommodate a modern enterprise structure in which thou-
sands or millions of independent contractors join forces to pro-
vide a service by agreement among themselves, antitrust law 
requires re-envisioning and careful application. The success of 
Uber, Airbnb, and other sharing economy firms, and the con-
sumer benefits that those firms promise, show both how diffi-
cult and how important that re-envisioning can be. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The sharing economy is a disruptive force challenging a 
wide range of legal and institutional structures. Sharing econ-
omy platform companies like Uber and Airbnb connect thou-
sands of suppliers with millions of consumers every day. They 
do this using instantaneous communication and massive in-
formation sorting technology to coordinate the actions of sup-
pliers and match them with consumers. In doing so, these 
platform companies have altered the basic conception of what 
constitutes a business firm. The resulting effect on antitrust 
law and policy is ambiguous, with conflict between apparent 
antitrust law concerns and evidence of massive consumer ben-
efits.1 
Antitrust law has evolved over more than a century to reg-
ulate a marketplace occupied by firms. It uses a complex set 
of rules to assess the economic effects of agreements between 
firms, but leaves conduct within a firm subject to little scru-
tiny. In a traditional firm, owners contribute capital, manag-
ers make business decisions, and employees implement those 
 
1 According to one study, “consumers always benefit from collaborative 
consumption.” Saif Benjaafar et al., Peer-to-Peer Product Sharing: Implica-
tions for Ownership, Usage, and Social Welfare in the Sharing Economy 3 
(Oct. 6 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with SSRN). 
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decisions. The sharing economy confronts antitrust law by dis-
aggregating the roles usually played by actors within a firm. 
In the sharing economy, workers provide much of the capital.2 
For example, Uber does not own a vast fleet of cars; its drivers 
supply the cars. The workers can be subject to substantial con-
trol by the managers of the platform, but are not treated as 
employees. This disaggregation takes activities that would 
usually be subject to little antitrust scrutiny because they are 
within a firm and subjects them to significantly greater anti-
trust scrutiny. Unthinking application of antitrust principles 
developed for the traditional firm to the reconfigured eco-
nomic structures of the sharing economy is inappropriate. 
Suppliers in a sharing economy enterprise reach agree-
ments with the platform company about the company’s terms 
of service. For example, sharing economy platforms nearly al-
ways include systems for making and receiving payment, im-
pose requirements for suppliers’ relationships with consum-
ers, and establish a means for consumer reviews. Other terms 
that are not as ubiquitous also exist. Some sharing economy 
enterprises include agreements between suppliers and the 
platform on the price to be charged. Some terms are competi-
tively neutral or procompetitive. Others, particularly includ-
ing agreements on price, are typically considered matters of 
substantial antitrust concern.  
Traditional black-letter antitrust law suggests alternative 
approaches to how courts should treat a sharing economy en-
terprise. One approach is to consider the agreements between 
suppliers and the platform to be “vertical agreements” subject 
to a fairly lenient “rule of reason.” Another approach is to treat 
the agreements as a “hub-and-spoke” conspiracy, reflecting a 
“horizontal agreement” among suppliers to the enterprise or-
chestrated by the platform.3 If a horizontal agreement is 
 
2 One study concludes that this operates to the benefit of below-me-
dian-income individuals, who are among the suppliers on sharing economy 
platforms. See Samuel Fraiberger & Arun Sundararajan, Peer-to-Peer 
Rental Markets in the Sharing Economy 4 (Sept. 10, 2017) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with SSRN). 
3 See Julian Nowag, The UBER-Cartel? UBER Between Labour and 
Competition Law, LUND EU L. REV., Fall 2016, at 94, 97, 
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found, it will be subject to varying treatment depending on the 
level of competitive sensitivity. Agreements on price—one of 
the most competitively sensitive terms—may even be auto-
matically illegal. This exact question is currently before a dis-
trict court in New York in consumer antitrust litigation 
against Uber. 
This Article analyzes these alternative approaches, taking 
account of leading authorities interpreting section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, to conclude that a “quick look” rule of reason is 
the most appropriate line of analysis for sharing economy 
terms of service that present the greatest antitrust concerns. 
Under the quick look approach, a plaintiff can easily demon-
strate the likelihood of anticompetitive effects and the defend-
ant must offer a procompetitive justification. “Per se” invalid-
ity remains possible but, in light of the unique benefits that 
sharing economy enterprises produce, is unlikely. Terms of 
service that touch on matters less competitively sensitive, in-
cluding payment terms and quality requirements for products 
and services, will likely receive a full-blown rule of reason 
analysis and be upheld under antitrust laws. 
Beyond analyzing the application of traditional antitrust 
principles to the sharing economy, this Article advocates a 
new approach. Unique to a sharing economy enterprise is a 
structure that resembles a single entity, yet remains a set of 
agreements among highly diffuse individual actors. This 
structure results in a sharing of economic risks among the 
participants in the sharing economy enterprise, which can in-
centivize efficiencies in operation that ordinarily are found in 
a single entity. This Article concludes that those efficiencies 
can overcome anticompetitive concerns about coordination on 
competitively sensitive matters. The resulting approach, rep-
resented by graphing the degree of risk-sharing in relation to 
the degree of coordination, promises a superior analysis for 
the application of section 1 of the Sherman Act to the sharing 
economy. 
 
[https://perma.cc/BW37-6E8D]; see generally Barak Orbach, Hub-and-
Spoke Conspiracies, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Apr. 2016, at 1. 
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Part II of this Article defines the sharing economy and sets 
forth the economic analysis that separates it from the tradi-
tional economy. Part III examines the antitrust principles un-
der section 1 of the Sherman Act that assess agreements be-
tween firms. Part IV analyzes the application of these 
principles to the sharing economy. Finally, Part V argues that 
these principles should be altered for application to the shar-
ing economy. Specifically, Part V argues that the categorical 
rules developed under section 1 should yield to an approach 
based more on matters of degree. And in applying this matter 
of degree approach, increased levels of coordination between 
actors in the sharing economy should be allowed under section 
1 because those actors share more economic risk with each 
other than do actors in the traditional economy. 
II. SHARING ECONOMY 
This Part explains the sharing economy in terms that pre-
pare for an analysis of the antitrust consequences of sharing 
economy firms. Subpart A defines the sharing economy, shar-
ing economy firms, and sharing economy enterprises by refer-
ence both to historic analogs and to information-age realities. 
Subpart B discusses the economics of the sharing economy, 
the four efficiencies that sharing economy firms all leverage 
to varying extents, and the complementary ideas of regulatory 
disruption and regulatory arbitrage. Subpart C examines the 
structure and operation of sharing economy firms with partic-
ular emphasis on Uber, Airbnb, Lyft, Couchsurfing, and 
TaskRabbit.  
A. Defining the Sharing Economy 
The sharing economy leverages resource cross-utilization.4 
Terminology varies; the sharing economy has been denoted 
 
4 See Akanksha Srivastava, Sharing Economy: Old World Renting 
Meets New World Technology, LINKEDIN (July 5, 2016), 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/sharing-economy-old-world-renting-meets-
new-akanksha-srivastava [perma.cc/JK2U-GHBU]. A substantial amount 
of the information and analysis governing the sharing economy is found 
online in the form of sophisticated news articles from outlets including 
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“the peer-to-peer economy,” “collaborative consumption,” “gig 
economy,” and “the access economy,” among other terms.5 All 
terms describe a “decentralized model whereby two individu-
als interact to buy or sell goods and services directly with each 
other, without intermediation by a third-party, or without the 
use of a company of business. The buyer and the seller trans-
act directly with each other.”6 Consistent with the November 
2016 Federal Trade Commission Staff Report, “The Sharing 
Economy: Issues Facing Platforms, Participants, and Regula-
tors,” (the “FTC Report”), this Article adopts use of the term 
“sharing economy.”7 
Some debate exists regarding the proper reach of the 
phrase “sharing economy.” More than one author questions 
entirely whether it is appropriate in the context of for-fee ex-
changes.8 The modern use of the phrase likely dates to 2007,9 
but is most frequently identified with a 2008 Creative Com-
mons license text by Lawrence Lessig.10 Lessig defined the 
sharing economy in juxtaposition to a commercial internet-
based economy. “[N]ot only is money not helpful. In many 
 
CNET and the Huffington Post, as well as in the blogosphere. By necessity, 
then, this Article includes more cites to blogs and other internet sources 
than is usual for legal scholarship.  
5 Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing: The Sharing Economy As 
an Alternative Capitalist System, 90 TUL. L. REV. 241, 243 (2015); FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, THE “SHARING” ECONOMY: ISSUES FACING PLATFORMS, PAR-





6 See Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Economy, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.in-
vestopedia.com/terms/p/peertopeer-p2p-economy.asp [perma.cc/WN43-
QBC6]. 
6 See FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 11. 
7 See FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 11. 
8 See, e.g., NICHOLAS A. JOHN, THE AGE OF SHARING 69 (2016) (noting an 
“often-heard critique” that sharing is distinct from renting); FTC Report, 
supra note 5, at 10–11. 
9 See John, supra note 8, at 72, 74 (citing sources from 2007). 
10 See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX (2008). 
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cases, adding money into the mix is downright destructive.”11 
To Lessig in 2008, Netflix, Amazon, and Google are paradigms 
of the internet-based commercial economy, while Wikipedia 
and the Linux operating system are paradigms of sharing.12 
Lessig penned his narrower definition before Uber and Airbnb 
existed.13  
Other (and more recent) scholarly analyses accept for-fee 
services as part of the sharing economy.14 Distinctions con-
tinue to be drawn between a resource use economic model, in-
cluding renting and fee-free sharing, and the transfer of own-
ership, including swapping, donating, and selling.15 For 
purposes of antitrust analysis, distinctions between renting 
and selling are immaterial.16 Distinctions between for-fee and 
fee-free sharing are not likely to change the antitrust analysis, 
which is broad enough to encompass non-financial transaction 
terms.17  
The notion of sharing is not new.18 The term “suggests the 
possibility of a society in which resources are distributed 
fairly.”19 Long-standing examples of sharing include carpools, 
a historic mechanism to conserve gasoline and to get around 
 
11 Id. at 146 (footnote omitted). 
12 Id. at 117–172. 
13 Uber self-dates to 2009 and Airbnb self-dates to August 2008. See 
Travis Kalanick, Uber’s Founding, UBER (Dec. 23, 2010), https://news-
room.uber.com/ubers-founding/ [perma.cc/A23Q-9JSU]; About Us, AIRBNB, 
https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us [perma.cc/VYP6-7SVT]. 
14 See, e.g., Juho Hamari et al., The Sharing Economy: Why People Par-
ticipate in Collaborative Consumption, 2 J. ASS’N. FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH. 
2047, 2047–50 (2015); RACHEL BOTSMAN & ROO ROGERS, WHAT’S MINE IS 
YOURS: THE RISE OF COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION xvi (2010). 
15 See Botsman & Rogers, supra note 14, at 3.  
16 It is possible that a rental market will produce different competitive 
effects than a market for sales. However, the arguments that this Article 
makes about what section 1 standard to apply do not depend on those dif-
ferences. 
17 Cf. Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the Not-
For-Profit Sector 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
12132, 2006) (“[P]romoting competition is socially valuable regardless of the 
particular objectives of producers.”). 
18 See generally JOHN, supra note 8, at 75–76. 
19 Id. at 76. 
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HOV restrictions on major commuting routes. For example, 
the decades-old practice of “slugging” in Washington D.C. per-
mits sharing of unused seats in commuters’ cars: 
“Slugging” is a term used to describe a unique form of 
commuting found in the Washington, DC area . . . . 
The system of slugging is quite simple. A car needing 
additional passengers to meet the required 3- person 
high occupancy vehicle (HOV) minimum pulls up to 
one of the known slug lines . . . . The slugs first in line 
for that particular destination then hop into the car, 
normally confirming the destination, and off they go. 
No money is exchanged because of the mutual benefit: 
the car driver needs riders just as much as the slugs 
need a ride.20 
The modern sharing economy relies on the internet to ac-
complish what slug lines have long achieved for commuting 
into the nation’s capital.21 Sharing economy enterprises have 
emerged in a wide variety of marketplaces, ranging from con-
tent/information (YouTube, Wikipedia) and capital (Kick-
starter) to transportation, housing, and personal services 
(Uber, Airbnb, and TaskRabbit). One paper categorized 254 
different enterprises meeting its definition of a sharing econ-
omy enterprise,22 while another source noted “‘about 600 peer-
to-peer startups.’”23 Most examples include sharing by trans-
ferring ownership, whether permanent or temporary, of cars, 
homes, bicycles,24 concert tickets,25 and related personal or 
real property. 
 
20 See About Slugging, SLUG-LINES.COM (last updated Aug. 5, 2017 
10:41 AM), http://www.slug-lines.com/Slugging/About_slugging.asp 
[perma.cc/UL8D-DX5K]. 
21 See Kate Evans, How Technology Has Created a Shared Economy, 
SOVTECH (Apr. 21, 2016), https://sov.tech/technology-created-shared-econ-
omy/ [perma.cc/T5BJ-5NY6]. 
22 Hamari et al., supra note 14, at 2050. 
23 FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 13–14 (quoting FTC Workshop panelist 
Chiara Farronato). 
24 See, e.g., DONKEY REPUBLIC, http://www.donkey.bike 
[perma.cc/565R-XFLY]. 
25 See, e.g., STUBHUB, https://www.stubhub.com [perma.cc/HUZ6-
4JJG]. 
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1. Sharing Economy Characteristics 
The term “sharing economy” describes a platform-based 
mode of exchange between consumers and suppliers. The plat-
form facilitates transactions that search costs and transaction 
costs would otherwise prevent. In theory, the platform need 
not be technology-based. The slugging example above dates 
back more than forty years to the gasoline crisis in the 
1970s.26 Farmers markets and college dining hall message 
boards have long served the matching service that sharing 
economy firms provide today.27 However, technology has rev-
olutionized these historic matching systems. That is partly be-
cause the modern sharing economy developed concurrently 
with the refinement of computer- and internet-based commu-
nication.28 It is also because technology-based communication 
methods are uniquely suited to minimize search and transac-
tion costs through rapid communication and comprehensive 
data gathering and sorting. 
a. Seven Defining Factors 
In its November 2016 Report, Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) staff identified several key features of sharing econ-
omy enterprises.29 First, the FTC recognized that a sharing 
economy marketplace has three players: consumers, suppli-
ers, and the platform.30 The platform is what is usually re-
ferred to as the “sharing economy firm.” The FTC Report also 
identified the following five factors: that consumers and 
 
26 About Slugging, supra note 20. 
27 See FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 11. 
28 According to one source, from 2005–2015, the percentage of U.S. 
adults using social media increased from 7% to 65%. Andrew Perrin, Social 
Media Usage: 2005-2015, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.pewinter-
net.org/2015/10/08/social-networking-usage-2005-2015 
[https://perma.cc/B6N4-8ANH]. This ten-fold increase coincides with the de-
velopment of Uber and Airbnb, founded in 2009 and 2008, respectively. See 
supra note 13. 
29 FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 16, 18–20. 
30 Id. at 18. 
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sellers are individuals or very small firms;31 that sellers or 
service sellers use existing personal assets and thus bear min-
imal costs of entry; that markets are sufficiently “thick” to en-
able liquidity; that the platform has appropriate procedures 
to ensure safety and reliability; and that the platform charges 
a fee or commission for its matching services.32 
This Article largely accepts the factors identified in the 
FTC Report for purposes of the analysis in Parts III–V.33 How-
ever, the FTC Report fails to identify one recurring feature of 
sharing economy enterprises—that of “regulatory disruption.” 
Regulatory disruption is sufficiently frequent and analytically 
relevant to warrant treatment as a seventh factor. In the fol-
lowing section, this Article describes regulatory disruption 
and its sibling, regulatory arbitrage.34 
In sum, the seven defining features of a sharing economy 
marketplace are: 
• Three players: consumers, suppliers, and plat-
form; 
• Atomistic consumers and suppliers; 
• Sellers face minimal entry and exit barriers by 
avoiding specialized investment; 
• Thick markets; 
• Platform provides assurance of safety and reliabil-
ity; 
• Platform charges fee or commission; and 
 
31 This factor distinguishes sharing economy enterprises analyzed here 
from “sharing” firms that are in reality engaged in short-term renting. See, 
e.g., CAPITAL BIKESHARE, www.capitalbikeshare.com [perma.cc/EAG8-
HQA3]. Capital Bikeshare’s assets are owned by a consortium of municipal-
ities in the Washington D.C. region. See Partners: Municipal Owners, CAPI-
TAL BIKESHARE, www.capitalbikeshare.com/partners [perma.cc/X7Y2-
PHTS].  
32  FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 19–20.  
33 One factor identified in the FTC Report—homogeneity of goods and 
services—is subject to meaningful challenge. See id. at 19 (citing FTC Work-
shop panelist Liran Einav). Sharing economy enterprises such as Airbnb, 
TaskRabbit, and Etsy, among others, involve substantial heterogeneity 
with regard to products or services as well as prices and idiosyncratic con-
tract terms.  
34 See infra Section II.A.2. 
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• Regulatory disruption. 
b. Nomenclature 
It is necessary to establish nomenclature for the partici-
pants in a sharing economy marketplace. The “sharing econ-
omy firm” is the platform. Firms do not employ the sellers, 
affiliating instead on a contract basis—the legal question of 
employment is not settled in the more centralized sharing 
economies.35 The “suppliers” are themselves individuals or 
firms. Finally, the combination of the platform and the suppli-
ers is a “sharing economy enterprise,” a phrase this Article 
uses to escape the economic and antitrust law implications of 
the word “firm.”36 
2. Regulatory Disruption and Regulatory 
Arbitrage 
This Article defines a sharing economy marketplace to in-
clude the possibility of “regulatory disruption” as a means of 
avoiding regulatory limits and the ensuing costs that burden 
established firms.37 Regulatory disruption and its sibling, reg-
ulatory arbitrage,38 enable sharing economy enterprises to 
achieve competitive scale through the growth of the combined 
enterprise (platform plus suppliers) as opposed to entering as 
a single firm with sufficient capital to bear the costs of regu-
lation.39  
 
35 See infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
36 With regard to the economic question of firm definition, see infra text 
accompanying notes 89–92 (discussing Coase in the context of the sharing 
economy). With regard to the single-firm question in antitrust law, see infra 
Part III. 
37 See Nicholas P. Terry, Regulatory Disruption and Arbitrage in 
Health-Care Data Protection, 17 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 143, 
156–58 (2017). 
38 See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229 
(2010). 
39 See generally NICOLE V. CRAIN & W. MARK CRAIN, U.S. SMALL BUS. 
ADMIN., THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY COSTS ON SMALL FIRMS 54–55 (2010), 
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/The%20Impact%20of%20Regula-
tory%20Costs%20on%20Small%20Firms%20(Summary).pdf 
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In general, regulatory disruption can be expected to occur 
when the disruptive enterprise adopts a meaningfully differ-
ent enterprise structure, such that applying an existing regu-
latory framework is difficult or impossible.40 The privately op-
erated payment system Bitcoin is an example of one such 
enterprise. Bitcoin employs an account-settling structure that 
uses a decentralized block-chain technology entirely distinct 
from the traditional means for settling accounts in U.S. pay-
ment systems. Bitcoin thereby avoids regulatory oversight it 
might otherwise have borne had it followed a traditional cen-
tralized account settlement procedure.41 Bitcoin developed as 
a privately ordered payment system and, only after proving 
its capacity for success at scale, faced the possibility of regu-
latory oversight.42 
Whether intentionally or otherwise, sharing economy en-
terprises take advantage of regulatory disruption to achieve 
competitive scale.43 For example, Airbnb began with short-
 
[perma.cc/J72S-8426]. The Crain & Crain study suggests substantial varia-
tion in the economic sector with a per-employee average across the economy, 
suggesting that small firms bear substantially greater regulatory costs as a 
result of not having achieved efficient scale. 
40 See generally Salil K. Mehra, Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Compe-
tition in the Time of Algorithms, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1323 (2016). 
41 See Felix Salmon, When Disruption Meets Regulation, REUTERS (Jan. 
30, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2014/01/30/when-disrup-
tion-meets-regulation/ [perma.cc/S9NN-5669]; Primavera de Filippi, To-
morrow’s Apps Will Come from Brilliant (And Risky) Bitcoin Code, WIRED 
(Mar. 8, 2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/03/decentralized-applications-
built-bitcoin-great-except-whos-responsible-outcomes/ [perma.cc/EQ3W-
6VDQ] (“The actual innovation brought about by Bitcoin is not the currency 
itself but the platform.”). 
42 See Primavera de Filippi, We Must Regulate Bitcoin. Problem Is, We 
Don’t Understand It, WIRED (Mar. 1, 2016), 
https://www.wired.com/2016/03/must-understand-bitcoin-regulate/ 
[perma.cc/328S-U95H] (“With a 5 billion market cap, Bitcoin is slowly mak-
ing its way into the digital economy, and a growing number of merchants—
including Overstock, Newegg, Expedia, Dell and even Microsoft—are now 
accepting Bitcoin as a possible form of payment for their products. Of course, 
regulation will be needed eventually, both to address the risks and maxim-
ize the benefits of the technology.”). 
43 See generally Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but for 
Local Government Policy: The Future of Local Regulation of the “Sharing 
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term rentals of air mattresses. While probably immune from 
scrutiny initially due to the de minimis scale, Airbnb also pre-
sented a lodging model that confounds the traditional regula-
tory scheme.44 The typical Airbnb supplier is not a licensed 
lodging enterprise, does not report income to the taxing au-
thorities, and may or may not make disclosures to its insur-
ance company. At the individual supplier level, Airbnb is ef-
fectively a gray market for housing. 
Regulatory arbitrage, in contrast, does not rely on a novel 
enterprise structure flying below the regulatory radar. Victor 
Fleisher describes regulatory arbitrage instead as “a perfectly 
legal planning technique used to avoid taxes, accounting 
rules, securities disclosure, and other regulatory costs.”45 For 
instance, where employment law imposes costs in the form of 
health care and social security coverage, firms may seek to 
avoid treating its labor force as “employees” to avoid those 
costs.46 Where antitrust law imposes obligations to self-report 
transactions over a certain size, firms may seek to conduct 
transactions on a smaller scale.47  
Sharing economy enterprises achieve characteristics of 
large integrated firms. These enterprises achieve a substan-
tial “nexus of contracts” that establish terms among the con-
 
Economy” (Geo. Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series No. 15-
01, 2015); Sofia Ranchordas, Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating Inno-
vation in the Sharing Economy, 16 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH 413 (2014). 
44 See Roberta A. Kaplan, Regulation and the Sharing Economy, 
N.Y.L.J. (July 18, 2014), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjour-
nal/almID/1202663656633 [perma.cc/3M62-BU9Z] (arguing “new technolo-
gies should not be banned outright simply because they cannot be neatly 
shoehorned into traditional business or regulatory models”). 
45 See Fleischer, supra note 38, at 229. 
46 Taxes and benefits on employee wages are commonly reported to in-
crease the cost of employment versus contracting by a multiple of 1.25–1.4. 
See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 15-A, EMPLOYER’S SUP-
PLEMENTAL TAX GUIDE (2017). 
47 See Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds for Section 7A of the Clayton 
Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 8524 (Jan. 26, 2017) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 801–
803). 
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stituent parts of the enterprise, as well as between the con-
stituent parts and third-party consumers.48 Achieving firm-
like stature while retaining the convenience of an enterprise 
comprised of independent contractors constitutes regulatory 
arbitrage and possibly regulatory disruption. As the next Sub-
part demonstrates, sharing economy marketplaces present a 
challenge to the Coasean distinction between intra-firm trans-
actions and marketplace transactions. 
3. Features of Leading Sharing Economy 
Enterprises 
Platforms establish “terms of service” that govern relation-
ships between the platform and suppliers. These terms of ser-
vice also frequently regulate consumers’ use of the platform 
and the contracts between suppliers and consumers. The ex-
tent to which platforms exercise control over suppliers and 
consumers via their terms of service varies. Table 1 below 
identifies several key functions of such terms of service and 
















48 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. 
ECON. 305 (1976) (“It is important to recognize that most organizations are 
simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relation-
ships among individuals.”). 
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TABLE 1: PLATFORMS’ TERMS OF SERVICE FEATURES 
 
 
 Uber Lyft ABB49 CS50 TR51 
Establishes a price for 
the service or product 
provided 
X52 X53  X54  
Controls the method of 
payment over the plat-
form 
X X X  X 
Maintains a functional-
ity for product or ser-
vice reviews 
X X X X55 X 
Sets minimum require-
ments for the sup-
plier’s personal or real 
property used in the 
transaction 
X     
Sets requirements 
meant to ensure com-
pliance with accessibil-
ity and other civil 
rights laws 
X     
Disclaims control over 
suppliers, including 





52 Subject to downward negotiation and, as of June 2017, tipping. See 
In-app Tips on Uber, UBER https://www.uber.com/ride/how-it-works/tips/ 
[perma.cc/2AL6-6DMQ]. 
53 Subject to tipping. See How to Tip Your Driver, LYFT, 
https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-us/articles/213583978-How-to-tip-your-driver 
[perma.cc/VM7Q-H7SB]. 
54 Price is required to be zero. See How It Works, COUCHSURFING, 
https://www.couchsurfing.com/#how-it-works [perma.cc/Y6GY-TKB9]. 
55 Referred to as “references,” these are less robust than the review 
functions of the for-fee sharing services discussed here. 
ANDERSON & HUFFMAN – FINAL 
No. 3:859] SHARING ECONOMY MEETS THE SHERMAN ACT 875 
their manner of per-
forming a service or 
providing a product 
Collects taxes imposed 
by a particular locality 
  X   
Ensures that realistic 
alternative means ex-
ist for suppliers to 
reach consumers 
  X  X 
a. Uber 
Uber first launched in 2010 as a small ride-share company 
out of San Francisco under the name Ubercab. The company 
was born in response to the difficulty of hailing a cab in San 
Francisco and allowed users of the service to flip the script by 
creating a means for drivers to come directly to those looking 
for a ride. Ubercab grew in popularity despite its initially 
higher costs, and eventually expanded into New York in 2011 
as Uber.56 Today, Uber self-reports operations in eighty-two 
countries,57 and valuation estimates for Uber range from 60–
 
56 Uber NYC Has Launched, UBER: UBERBLOG (May 4, 2011), 
https://www.uber.com/blog/new-york-city/uber-nyc-launches-service/ 
[perma.cc/6ZPE-UHYD]. 
57 See International Sites, UBER, https://www.uber.com/country-list/ 
(last visited on Oct. 27, 2017). 
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70 billion dollars.58 According to the most recent comprehen-
sive survey in July 2016, Uber averages 15.8 million monthly 
active users.59  
Uber’s terms of service with consumers establish the plat-
form as a “technology company” and “matching service” be-
tween consumers and third party providers of, primarily, ride 
services.60 Uber’s driver contract (referred to on the Uber web-
site as “terms and conditions”61) similarly limits Uber’s role in 
the transaction to that of “lead generation to independent pro-
 
58 See, e.g., Uber: The Road to a $69 Billion Valuation, WALL STREET 
SURVIVOR (July 17, 2017), http://blog.wallstreetsurvi-
vor.com/2017/07/17/uber-road-69-billion-valuation/ [perma.cc/QYN7-
ZKEB]; Maya Kosoff, A Look Inside the Insanely Successful Life of Billion-
aire Uber CEO Travis Kalanick, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 6, 2015), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/inside-the-successful-life-of-billionaire-
uber-ceo-travis-kalanick-2015-7 [perma.cc/3J4E-C7YD]. As a privately held 
company, such valuation is an estimation. It is frequently questioned. See, 
e.g., Julie Verhage, An Expert in Valuation Says Uber Is Only Worth $28 
Billion, Not $62.5 Billion, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 27, 2016, 1:32 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-17/an-expert-in-valua-
tion-says-uber-may-have-already-peaked [perma.cc/8V3K-5NSW]. 
59 See Mike Sonders, These Latest Uber Statistics Show How It’s Dom-
inating Lyft, MEDIUM (Dec. 7, 2016) https://medium.com/@sm_app_in-
tel/these-latest-uber-statistics-show-how-its-dominating-lyft-53f6b255de5e 
[perma.cc/7Q43-E9K5]. 
60 The Services comprise mobile applications and related services 
(each, an “Application”), which enable users to arrange and schedule trans-
portation, logistics, delivery services, and/or purchase certain goods, includ-
ing with third party providers of such services and goods under agreement 
with Uber or certain of Uber’s affiliates (“Third Party Providers”). In certain 
instances, the Services may also include an option to receive transportation, 
logistics, and/or delivery services for an upfront price, subject to acceptance 
by the respective Third Party Providers. Unless otherwise agreed by Uber 
in a separate written agreement, the Services are made available solely for 
personal, noncommercial use. U.S. Terms of Use, UBER, 
https://www.uber.com/legal/terms/us/ [perma.cc/8M7U-CKUE]. 
61 Agreeing to Terms and Conditions, UBER 
https://help.uber.com/h/44cf1f0e-27ca-4919-9621-f1321a0381c1 (last visited 
Dec. 2, 2017). 
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viders of rideshare or peer-to-peer (collectively, ‘P2P’) passen-
ger transportation services.”62 Drivers “acknowledge and 
agree that Company is a technology services provider that 
does not provide transportation services.”63 Uber further sets 
terms governing the relationship between Uber and drivers as 
well as the contract relationships between drivers and passen-
gers.64 Of particular note, the Uber driver contract imposes 
default fares, which drivers may negotiate down at their ini-
tiative.65 The agreement does not describe how such negoti-
ated fares would operate in reality, and there is some evidence 
that downward fare negotiation is not a reality for ride shar-
ing on the Uber platform.66 However, the contours of the Uber 
pricing regime are not static and can be expected to change. 
In June 2017, Uber added functionality allowing passengers 
 




64 See id. at 3–7. These include requirements for use of Uber services; 
contract termination based on ratings; Uber’s role in establishing default 
fares and collecting those fares; and drivers’ status as independent contrac-
tors with limited control over driving by Uber. Under the heading “Use of 
the Uber Services,” the driver contract also dictates terms of the transac-
tions between drivers and passengers. These include communications be-
tween driver and passenger; driver’s obligation to provide equipment and 
services under the transportation agreement; driver’s obligation to 
transport service animals; ratings made by drivers of passengers and pas-
sengers’ right to rate drivers; requirements for driver vehicles; “default” 
fares to be charged, based on location of the ride; adjustments to fares based 
on local market factors; and adjustments to fares based on driver conduct 
including an inefficient routing. 
65 Id. at 7. In the ordinary course, upward negotiation is not part of the 
Uber pricing regime. Exceptions include negotiations on long-distance trips 
and negotiations on multiple stop. 
66 An Uber driver’s forum, uberpeople.net, contains much discussion 
about the apparent possibility of negotiating fares, but no indication that 
any driver had ever actually exercised the apparent contract right to nego-
tiate a lower fare. See generally Jagman, We Can Negotiate the Fare, UBER-
PEOPLE (Feb. 14, 2017), https://uberpeople.net/threads/we-can-negotiate-
the-fare.141426/ [perma.cc/T3DL-WUL8] (containing a Melbourne, Aus-
tralia, driver discussion board). 
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to tip drivers, with the result that the total cost of a ride can 
now be negotiated upward via a tip.67 
b. Airbnb 
In 2008, Airbnb was founded in San Francisco by three 
founders who rented out air mattresses for use in their apart-
ment. They created a user-friendly website advertising the 
space at a rate of $80 per person per night, an amount signif-
icantly less than local hotels. After three guests rented in a 
single night, they decided to expand the idea.68 Airbnb now 
connects people to a wide variety of spaces, including apart-
ments, homes, castles, and villas, in more than 65,000 cities 
and 191 countries, with over three million listings world-
wide.69 The success of Airbnb may be partially attributed to 
its personalized customer service, competitive pricing, and 
creative use of technology.  
The Airbnb model is centered on short-term accommoda-
tions, where potential guests can browse available listings fil-
tered to meet their needs. For example, upon selecting a des-
tination, a potential guest can filter their search results to 
specify room type—e.g., a private room, shared room, or entire 
home—as well as price range. Once the selections have been 
made, Airbnb displays to the user all accommodation profiles 
that fit the specifications. These profiles are created by the 
owner of the accommodation, and typically include photos, re-
views by other Airbnb users who have stayed at the accommo-
dation, and a description.70  
Like Uber, Airbnb is a “platform” for matching service pro-
viders with consumers of services.71 The platform charges fees 
 
67 See Can I Tip My Driver With the App?, UBER, 
https://help.uber.com/h/8459a496-5ed2-4f9d-b15c-d8afd9ccf34f 
[perma.cc/ZAF8-4PJ4]. 
68 See Anna Vital, How Airbnb Started, ADIOMA (Apr. 10, 2014), 
http://fundersandfounders.com/how-airbnb-started/ [perma.cc/X4VT-
7LWB]. 
69 About Us, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us 
[perma.cc/G5K3-3ZYD]. 
70 See AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/ [perma.cc/5U5G-U8P6]. 
71 According to Airbnb’s Terms of Service: 
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for its services.72 Those fees are primarily imposed on the pro-
vider of services rather than on the consumer. Airbnb’s other 
roles in the financial aspects of the service transaction include 
collecting payment from the consumer to make payment to the 
provider and charging the consumer additional fees for dam-
age incurred.73 Airbnb does not establish the price of the ser-
vice provided. 
c. Other Examples 
Lyft is another sharing economy firm supporting a ride 
sharing enterprise by contract with driver/owners. Similar to 
Uber, Lyft has a smart phone app that allows users to connect 
with drivers in order to get to a destination of the passenger’s 
choosing. Lyft offers marginally greater flexibility in contract 
terms than Uber; for instance, Lyft offers the option to tip the 
driver through the app, a feature historically unavailable for 
 
1.1 The Airbnb Platform is an online marketplace that ena-
bles registered users (“Members”) and certain third parties 
who offer services (Members and third parties who offer ser-
vices are “Hosts” and the services they offer are “Host Ser-
vices”) to publish such Host Services on the Airbnb Platform 
(“Listings”) and to communicate and transact directly with 
Members that are seeking to book such Host Services (Mem-
bers using Host Services are “Guests”) . . . . 
1.2 As the provider of the Airbnb Platform, Airbnb does not 
own, create, sell, resell, provide, control, manage, offer, de-
liver, or supply any Listings or Host Services. Hosts alone 
are responsible for their Listings and Host Services. When 
Members make or accept a booking, they are entering into a 
contract directly with each other. Airbnb is not and does not 
become a party to or other participant in any contractual re-
lationship between Members, nor is Airbnb a real estate bro-
ker or insurer. Airbnb is not acting as an agent in any ca-
pacity for any Member, except as specified in the Payments 
Terms.  
Terms of Service, AIRBNB (last updated June 19, 2017), 
https://www.airbnb.com/terms [perma.cc/78YD-FKEY]. 
72 See Payment Terms of Service, AIRBNB (June 19, 2017), 
https://www.airbnb.com/terms/payments_terms [perma.cc/4G42-5TKH]. 
73 See id. 
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Uber drivers (although this has recently changed).74 Drivers 
may serve as suppliers in both the Uber and Lyft enterprises 
at the same time, and some evidence exists that this is not 
uncommon.75  
Another sharing economy firm is Couchsurfing. Couchsurf-
ing provides a platform for hosts to spotlight an empty space 
for travelers. Couchsurfing classifies itself as a hospitality and 
social networking centered site. The amenities available vary, 
although most frequently guests receive, as the name implies, 
a couch. Accommodations listed on Couchsurfing are free. The 
articulated mission of the platform is to create a space that 
allows people to “share lives, create connections, offer kind-
ness, stay connected and to leave it better than you found it.”76 
Couchsurfing became for-profit in 2014.77 But Couchsurfing 
continues to connect suppliers and consumers for fee-free ac-
commodations and specifically prohibits suppliers from charg-
ing for use.78 Couchsurfing disclaims any role in transactions 
except for serving as a matching service.79 
 
74 See Uber vs Lyft: A Side-By-Side Comparison, RIDESTER (last up-
dated Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.ridester.com/uber-vs-lyft/ 
[perma.cc/3ZFC-MPTT]. See supra note 66 for details of Uber’s policy 
change. 
75 See id. 
76 See Our Values, COUCHSURFING, http://www.couchsurf-
ing.com/about/values/ [perma.cc/LMC7-KXYV]. 
77 See The Rise and Fall of Couchsurfing, NITHIN COCA (Mar. 27, 2013) 
http://www.nithincoca.com/2013/03/27/the-rise-and-fall-of-couchsurfing/ 
[perma.cc/B9Q6-3BMZ].  
78 According to the Couchsurfing policies: 
3. Don’t Charge for Your Couch: Our community offers free 
exchange of hospitality. Asking for money or labor in ex-
change for your couch, or referring members to paid accom-
modation services, is not allowed.  
Couchsurfing Policies, COUCHSURFING, http://www.couchsurf-
ing.com/about/policies/ [perma.cc/65WT-EE5T]. 
79 The Couchsurfing terms of use state: 
Our Services provide a platform for members to learn about 
one another, arrange stays and travel, engage in activities 
and communicate with one another. Couchsurfing is not a 
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Finally, TaskRabbit provides a matching platform for 
small-to-medium chores requiring moderate skills, including 
packing for moves, furniture assembly, home cleaning, gen-
eral handyman work, personal assistant work, closet organiz-
ing, and research, among others. The platform connects sup-
pliers, called “Taskers,” with consumers. Taskers list their 
services for a price on the platform and TaskRabbit facilitates 
the transaction. Of the enterprises detailed in this Subpart, 
TaskRabbit exercises the least control over the transactions 
between suppliers and consumers. It allows for ratings, con-
trols payments, and imposes warranties of timeliness, quality 
and skills, and expertise on the Taskers.80 
B. Economics of the Sharing Economy 
Transactions occur where the gains, net of search and 
transaction costs, are positive for both parties (and superior 
to alternatives).81 The transactions such as ride sharing and 
casual lodging services that are taking place in the sharing 
economy today may not have occurred historically because the 
search and transaction costs exceeded the potential gains. By 
 
party to, has no involvement or interest in, makes no repre-
sentations or warranties as to, and has no responsibility or 
liability with respect to any communications, transactions, 
interactions, disputes or any relations whatsoever between 
you and any other member, person or organization. You are 
solely responsible for your interactions with other members 
of our Services. We reserve the right, but have no obligation, 
to monitor interactions between you and other members of 
our Services. 
Remember, the Couchsurfing Services are just a platform 
that enable you to communicate and interact with other peo-
ple around the world. We cannot be responsible for the in-
teractions that you have with other Couchsurfing members, 
so please use good judgment and keep safety in mind when 
you use our Services.  
Terms of Use, COUCHSURFING, (last updated July 19, 2017), 
http://www.couchsurfing.com/about/terms-of-use/ [perma.cc/98XS-5ZXN]. 
80 See TaskRabbit Terms of Service, TASKRABBIT (last updated June 1, 
2017), https://www.taskrabbit.com/terms [perma.cc/42ML-77KF]. 
81 FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 18. 
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reducing those search and transaction costs, the sharing econ-
omy has enabled transactions that could not occur in a pre-
internet economy. 
1. Efficiencies in the Sharing Economy 
Sharing economy firms succeed by leveraging several key 
efficiencies, including efficiencies of: 
• the online platform; 
• low search and transaction costs; 
• regulatory disruption and arbitrage; and 
• small scale.82 
All of the sharing economy enterprises detailed in Subpart 
A above operate entirely through online communication. For 
example, an Uber rider does not contact the firm through a 
brick-and-mortar store-front. Even online communication is 
channeled to maximize efficiency. The Uber website landing 
page lacks a “contact us” link.83 Once Uber uses its online plat-
form to establish relationships with drivers and riders, it is 
extremely efficient in connecting drivers with riders. This se-
cond efficiency may be Uber’s primary reason for quick suc-
cess. It replaced an outdated labor-intensive system of match-
ing taxi drivers with riders through telephones and dispatch 
centers. Likewise, Airbnb’s matching service, which takes 
place online and through its smartphone app, reduces search 
and transaction costs relative to traditional marketing chan-
nels. 
Other efficiencies are not inherent to the business model, 
but are instead the result of sharing economy firms’ status as 
disruptors. Because these firms are sufficiently unlike exist-
ing providers in their industry, they may end run anachronis-
tic regulatory schemes that date back decades, if not more 
than a century, to the development of the original industry. 
Uber demonstrates the reality of hopeless anachronism in the 
 
82 See generally Benjamin G. Edelman & Damien Geradin, Efficiencies 
& Regulatory Shortcuts: How Should We Regulate Companies Like Airbnb 
and Uber?, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 293 (2016). 
83 See UBER, https://www.uber.com/ [perma.cc/C59H-ZMNJ]. 
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system of taxicab medallions and rate regulation for taxi 
fares. Other enterprises, such as Airbnb and TaskRabbit, may 
fail to collect state or local taxes or satisfy other regulatory 
requirements such as licensure. Initial small scale allows 
sharing economy firms to prove new business models to both 
venture capital firms and regulators, while operating under 
the radar until larger operating scale is achieved. These effi-
ciencies permit sharing economy enterprises to make mean-
ingful dents in revenues in their respective industries with the 
benefits flowing to consumers.84 
2. Both Centralized and Competitive 
Sharing economy enterprises confound regulation that is 
designed to control centrally coordinated unitary firms.85 
These enterprises can achieve massive scale. By one estimate, 
the total value of Uber’s bookings for its core business line ap-
proached $20 billion in 2016.86 Uber achieves that value while 
avoiding both ownership costs for the primary capital invest-
ment—the cars—and responsibility as an employer for salary 
and benefits to its drivers. Instead, Uber acts as facilitator for 
a substantial market populated by individual competitors.87 
The definitional characteristics of a sharing economy mar-
ketplace include its capacity to bring together atomistic sup-
pliers and consumers transacting around relatively homoge-
nous goods and services. The technology that supports the 
 
84 See Georgios Zervas et al., The Rise of the Sharing Economy: Esti-
mating the Impact of Airbnb on the Hotel Industry (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Mgmt., 
Research Paper No. 2013-16, 2014). 
85 See generally Stephen R. Miller, First Principles for Regulating the 
Sharing Economy, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 147, 149–51 (2016). 
86 See Tyler Durden, Uber’s Massive Cash Burn Problem: 2016 Loss Set 
to Hit a Record $3 Billion, ZEROHEDGE (Dec. 20, 2016), http://www.zero-
hedge.com/news/2016-12-20/ubers-massive-cash-burn-problem-2016-loss-
set-hit-record-3-billion [perma.cc/Z5ED-Z2P5] (reporting approximately $5 
billion quarterly in revenue from rideshare bookings). 
87 As a practical matter, selecting a driver on Uber is not a trivial task. 
Riders must first hail a ride and, if the driver is not to their liking (for ex-
ample, if the rating score is low), the rider must cancel the ride within the 
allowed five-minute time period and hail another ride. 
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enterprise mitigates historic limitations on information avail-
ability. Thus, a sharing economy marketplace may better 
achieve the idealized perfectly competitive state. Each sup-
plier faces a flat demand curve, representing infinite elastic-
ity. The competitors provide the enterprise with both labor 
and capital, two of the three factors of production. The com-
petitors also play a decision-making role in their small part of 
the enterprise over matters such as where to operate, what 
parts of the day to offer services, and—for instance, in the case 
of Uber—when to service or replace the vehicles. 
Sharing economy enterprises do not escape the need for 
centralized coordination, however. The platforms exercise 
varying levels of control over suppliers. At one extreme, some 
platforms exercise very little control and merely allow con-
sumers and suppliers to find each other. For instance, well-
known platform eBay exercises limited control over suppli-
ers.88 Of the enterprises considered in Subpart A, TaskRabbit 
is the least coordinated. At the other extreme, a platform may 
establish prices and other terms of service. Uber is an example 
of this higher level of centralized control. The more coordina-
tion that exists, the more the sharing economy enterprise pre-
sents itself to consumers as a unitary entity. This distinction 
between competition and monopoly is essential to understand-
ing the antitrust implications of sharing economy market-
places, discussed further in Parts III–V. 
3. Disrupting the Coasean Firm 
Eighty years ago, Ronald Coase set out to define a firm. 
Coase distinguished between coordination within a firm and 
 
88 See EBAY, https://www.ebay.com/ [perma.cc/8SXD-N4CD]; see also 
ETSY, https://www.etsy.com/ [perma.cc/36LG-Y5YY]. Controls over suppli-
ers on eBay, for example, include a short set of “listing conditions,” a list of 
“prohibited and restricted items,” and intellectual property rules (ignoring 
the contract terms between eBay and its suppliers). See eBay User Agree-
ment, eBay, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/user-agreement.html#6 
[perma.cc/4MRL-S4Q7]. This two-page set of terms governs a marketplace 
with approximately $84 billion in yearly transactions. See EBAY, 2016 AN-
NUAL REPORT 4 (2017). 
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market transactions between firms.89 Coordination within a 
firm was characterized by an entrepreneur who gave direction 
to employees. The entrepreneur controlled which employees 
did what and how they did it. If employees did not want to 
follow these directions, they could quit. In market transac-
tions, on the other hand, the firm purchased goods and ser-
vices without the power to direct how these goods were pro-
duced or services rendered. The firm paid a price for an 
outcome specified in the contract. Coase reasoned that entre-
preneurs would choose between intrafirm coordination and 
market transactions depending on which offered the best 
tradeoff of costs and benefits. At the height of the industrial 
age, large manufacturing firms raised huge amounts of money 
to build large factories where they directed the work of thou-
sands of laborers to produce steel, cars, and trains. 
Sharing economy enterprises realign the ownership and 
control structure by minimizing the cost of marketplace trans-
actions and reducing the need for aggregating large amounts 
of capital within a single firm. Transactions previously more 
efficient when centrally coordinated have become efficient as 
marketplace transactions.90 Entrepreneurial control remains 
within the firm. However, as a matter of definition, sharing 
economy enterprises outsource labor to independent contrac-
tors.91 Capital ownership is also outsourced, with sharing 
economy firms contracting with the owners of cars, apart-
ments, bicycles, tools and equipment, or other real or personal 
property, to rent or sell those assets using the platform. Thus, 
the enterprise may enjoy many of the efficiencies of an inte-
grated firm while also gaining the efficiencies of marketplace 
 
89 See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
90 See Anders Hansen Henten & Iwona Maria Windekilde, Transaction 
Costs and the Sharing Economy, 18 INFO 1, 6–9 (2016). 
91 As a legal matter, this is subject to continued debate and litigation. 
See, e.g., Mumin v. Uber Techs., Inc., 239 F. Supp. 3d 507 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) 
(assessing a claim for denial of rights through misclassifying drivers as in-
dependent contractors and denying motion to dismiss in part). See generally 
Erin Mulvaney, Regulators & Lawyers Race to Respond to a Thriving Gig 
Economy, NAT’L L.J. (Aug. 1, 2017) https://www.law.com/nationallawjour-
nal/almID/1202793484793 [perma.cc/BSM4-L4WP]. 
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transactions.92 The net result is that individuals supply the 
capital and the labor, while the platform supplies the market-
ing and varying levels of control. 
The Article turns in Part III to an examination of the core 
antitrust rules that govern firms and transactions in the U.S. 
economy. Those rules’ application in the context of the sharing 
economy is a matter of existential importance for some or all 
of these firms. 
III. SHERMAN ACT STRUCTURE 
Federal antitrust law has controlled the legal assessment 
of competitive behavior for more than 125 years. The Sherman 
Act is the principal vehicle for that assessment. The basic 
structure of the Sherman Act divides competitive behavior 
into classifications and subjects each class to different levels 
of assessment. Some behavior is automatically lawful. Other 
behavior is automatically unlawful. The legality of still other 
behavior depends on its economic effect in the particular cir-
cumstance. The Act uses two variables to achieve this differ-
entiation. First, the Act treats conduct differently depending 
on whether it is the product of an agreement. The Supreme 
Court has developed complex rules about when an agreement 
will be deemed to exist and how different agreements will be 
assessed. Second, the Act treats conduct differently depending 
on whether the actor(s) have or are close to possessing market 
power.  
Doctrinally, the Act uses a complex set of elements to as-
sess the effects of agreements and market power. Section 1 
condemns agreements that unreasonably restrain trade, pro-
hibiting “[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in 
 
92 See Dyal-Chand, supra note 5, at 267 (“Sharing markets, and the 
sharing economy more broadly, seem to violate the claims of Coase and 
Demsetz . . . . [W]hy do these individuals neither join firms nor go it alone 
. . . ?”); see generally Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the 
Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002) (discussing the different em-
phasis on marketplace transactions over hierarchical structure presented 
by sharing economy enterprises). 
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restraint of trade . . . .”93 The requirement of a contract, com-
bination or conspiracy is referred to as the agreement or con-
certed action requirement. For more than one hundred years, 
the Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the restraint 
of trade element to prohibit only restraints that are unreason-
able.94 Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization 
and attempted monopolization.95 Monopolization requires 
power over price and untoward conduct to acquire or maintain 
that power.96 Attempted monopolization occurs when an actor 
is dangerously close to monopoly power, has the specific intent 
to monopolize,97 and takes predatory steps toward that end.98 
Since sharing economy actors are pioneers in potentially dis-
ruptive incursions into existing markets, the possession of or 
dangerous proximity to monopoly power seems less likely 
than the potential for anticompetitive contracts.99 Therefore, 
this Article will focus on analysis of antitrust concerns arising 
under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
 
93 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
94 See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61–62 
(1911). 
95 15 U.S.C § 2 (2012). Section 2 also prohibits conspiracies to monopo-
lize. See id. This prohibition has little practical importance since such a con-
spiracy would already be illegal under § 1. 
96 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966) (“The 
offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the 
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful ac-
quisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or de-
velopment as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or his-
toric accident.”). 
97 See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993). 
98 See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 149 (1951). 
99 Monopolization has been alleged against one sharing economy enter-
prise, Uber, in federal lawsuits in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and 
in the Northern District of California. See Phila. Taxi Ass’n, Inc. v. Uber 
Techs., Inc., 218 F. Supp. 3d 389 (E.D.Pa. 2016) (attempted monopolization 
claim dismissed for lack of standing); DeSoto Cab Co. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 
No. 16-CV-06385 (N.D. Cal. filed Nov. 2, 2016). The claim in the Northern 
District of California is unlikely to succeed due to difficulties alleging and 
proving monopoly power. 
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A. The Agreement Requirement 
Agreements and conspiracies are familiar concepts in ar-
eas of the law as diverse as contracts and criminal law. How-
ever, the competitive policies underlying the Sherman Act 
have given rise to a specialized body of law. First, the Act has 
been interpreted to insulate conduct within a single firm from 
scrutiny under section 1. Second, some conduct between firms, 
which is in some sense collaborative, is sometimes deemed 
unilateral. 
The single entity fiction protects intrafirm conduct. The 
thousands of people involved in the business decisions of a 
large publicly held corporation as officers, directors, and em-
ployees are each individual actors. If they got together to sell 
cocaine or pursue a terrorist attack, they would be guilty of 
criminal conspiracy. The existence of the corporation would 
not insulate them from guilt. However, under the Sherman 
Act, those actors are deemed to be a single entity and incapa-
ble of conspiring with each other while they pursue the firm’s 
interests. Two modern Supreme Court cases explore the 
boundaries of this doctrine. In Copperweld Corp. v. Independ-
ence Tube Corp.,100 a parent corporation and its wholly-owned 
subsidiary were alleged to have conspired in violation of sec-
tion 1. Previous opinions of the Court had stated that such a 
conspiracy was possible.101 After considering the policy be-
hind the concerted action requirement, the Court held that a 
conspiracy between a parent corporation and its wholly-owned 
subsidiary was not possible under section 1.102 
In American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League,103 
the Court returned to the single entity fiction. The thirty-two 
team members of the National Football League were alleged 
to have agreed among themselves when the NFL licensing 
 
100 See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). 
101 See e.g., United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 229 (1947); 
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 212–
13 (1951). 
102 See Copperweld Corp., 467 U.S. at 768–72. 
103 See American Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183 
(2010). 
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arm granted an exclusive license to Reebok to use team trade-
marks on caps.104 Of course, the contract between the league 
and Reebok was itself an agreement subject to scrutiny under 
section 1. However, a horizontal agreement among the teams 
would be subject to separate, more searching, scrutiny. After 
examining the holding and policy discussion in Copperweld,105 
the Court held that the league members were not joined to-
gether in a single entity. They were therefore capable of con-
spiring with one another for purposes of section 1.106 The 
Court reasoned that the league members did not have a suffi-
cient unity of economic interest to constitute a single entity 
for Sherman Act purposes.107 
Determining whether more than one entity exists is only 
the first step in an agreement analysis. The next question is 
whether those firms have entered into an agreement. Some-
times this is easy. Two or more firms may enter into an ex-
press contract. Similarly, an organization may adopt rules to 
govern the conduct of its members.108 Other times the agree-
ment question is factually or legally more difficult. Factually, 
firms may deny that they ever talked to each other or other-
wise communicated and were unconcerned with each other’s 
conduct. Legally, courts may be called upon to determine 
whether interdependent conduct constitutes an agreement. 
Both of these issues were raised in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly.109 The plaintiffs there alleged that the defendant 
telecommunications companies had agreed to divide the coun-
try into territories and refrain from competing with one an-
other. The defendants argued that the complaint failed to ad-
equately allege the agreement. At one level this is a 
straightforward factual dispute. Did the defendants communi-
cate with one another and divide up the market? The Court 
 
104 Id. at 187. 
105 Id. at 194–95. 
106 Id. at 201. 
107 Id. at 197–202. 
108 See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of 
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 
435 U.S. 679, 683 (1978). 
109 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
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held that the complaint did not adequately allege that they 
had.110 At another level, the dispute requires answering a 
complex legal question.  
Conduct by two or more firms can be divided into three cat-
egories. Firstly, they may enter into a communicated agree-
ment. Secondly, they may act completely independently; they 
may refrain from communicating and be unconcerned about 
each other’s behavior. Finally, firms may act in an interde-
pendent manner. Interdependence arises when firms observe 
each other and react to each other’s behavior. The relevance 
of interdependent behavior under section 1 has been discussed 
for more than a half century.111 In Twombly, the Court stated 
that interdependent behavior does not constitute an agree-
ment.112 
In summary, an agreement under section 1 requires two or 
more firms to enter into a communicated agreement. These 
questions of law and proof regarding the agreement question 
are critical to understanding the treatment of sharing econ-
omy enterprises under the Sherman Act. These enterprises 
present questions of both (1) single entity status and (2) inde-
pendence, interdependence, or coordination of conduct. Of 
course, not every agreement between two or more firms is il-
legal under section 1. Agreements are illegal only if they un-
reasonably restrain trade.  
B. The Unreasonableness Requirement 
Although the text of section 1 literally prohibits every 
agreement in restraint of trade, the Act has long been inter-
preted to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade.113 
The unreasonableness of an agreement may be demonstrated 
in either of two ways. Some agreements are unreasonable per 
 
110 Id. at 566. 
111 See Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sher-
man Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 
671–72 (1962). 
112 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553–54. 
113 See Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238–39 (1918). 
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se.114 Other agreements are subject to the rule of reason that 
assesses the competitive effect of the agreement in the partic-
ular situation. Per se illegal agreements include price fixing115 
and market allocation by competitors.116 It was the per se rule 
against market allocation by competitors that was at issue in 
Twombly.117 The per se rules against price fixing and market 
allocation by competitors demonstrate that the antitrust laws 
are generally more concerned about agreements among com-
petitors. These agreements are referred to as horizontal 
agreements. 
1. Defining the Categorical Prohibition of Per Se 
Rules 
Whenever the law defines a rule based on a category of con-
duct, the definition of that category becomes crucial. Per se 
rules against horizontal price fixing and market allocation re-
quire that the agreement be among competitors. However, the 
law further divides horizontal agreements and subjects only 
some of them to the per se rule. The Supreme Court has some-
times struggled with determining the exact parameters of the 
horizontal per se rules. In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia 
 
114 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 
886 (2007). 
115 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) 
(“Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with 
the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a 
commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se.”). 
116 United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (“One 
of the classic examples of a per se violation of § 1 is an agreement between 
competitors at the same level of the market structure to allocate territories 
in order to minimize competition.”). In addition to price fixing and market 
allocation by competitors, the Supreme Court has sometimes stated that 
boycotts and tying are per se illegal. See, e.g., Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale 
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (assessing boycotts); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. 
United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (assessing tying). 
117 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550–51. Because Twombly was decided on 
the question of whether an agreement existed, the Court did not address 
the question of the reasonableness of the conduct.  
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Broadcast System, Inc.,118 CBS claimed that the defendant 
copyright pools had violated the per se rule against horizontal 
price fixing. The defendants were pools of copyright owners 
who combined to offer a blanket license to all of the copyrights 
in the pool. The blanket license was priced by the pool. This 
arrangement involved a horizontal agreement by competitive 
licensors of copyrights and did determine the price of the blan-
ket license. Thus, in the plaintiff’s view, the agreement was 
per se illegal as horizontal price fixing.  
The Court held that since the agreement was price fixing 
only in the “literal sense,” it was not subject to the per se 
rule.119 The Court noted that the blanket license was not 
something that any of the copyright holders could sell them-
selves.120 Competition among copyright holders for licenses to 
their individual copyrights remained unaffected by the agree-
ment to form the copyright pools and offer the blanket li-
cense.121 Thus, the parameters of the per se rule against hor-
izontal price fixing were refined in BMI. In addition to 
horizontality in the agreement and an effect on price, an 
agreement is per se illegal as price fixing only if it affects the 
price at which the parties will sell something that they could 
have sold individually.122 This process of refinement is poten-
tially in play whenever the law uses a categorical rule. The 
parameters of the rule must be defined to advance the policy 
behind the rule. If a categorical rule cannot be defined in such 
a way that it advances the policy behind the rule, the categor-
ical approach should be rejected.  
 
118 See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 
(1979). 
119 See id. at 8. 
120 Id. at 23. (“ASCAP does set the price for its blanket license, but that 
license is quite different from anything any individual owner could issue.”). 
121 See id. at 23–24. 
122 See also Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 356 
(1982) (focusing on whether the agreement affected the price of goods or 
services that the parties to the agreement could have sold individually also 
controlled the outcome). 
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2. Reducing the Number of Per Se Rules 
During the last forty years, the Supreme Court has re-
duced the number of per se rules and overturned several that 
condemned agreements that were not horizontal. An agree-
ment between a buyer and a seller is referred to as a vertical 
agreement. The simplest form of a vertical agreement is a con-
tract of sale which merely sets the price in the sale transac-
tion. Obviously, an ordinary contract of sale does not violate 
the Sherman Act. However, sometimes a seller seeks to con-
trol the resale of the product by the buyer. The seller may 
want to control how much the buyer charges on resale. Such 
an agreement is referred to as resale price maintenance. The 
seller may want to control to whom the buyer resells the prod-
uct. Such a restriction might be geographic or based on some 
other classification of customers. These agreements are re-
ferred to as vertical non-price restrictions on distribution. 
Starting in 1911, minimum resale price maintenance was con-
demned as a violation of section 1.123 Maximum resale price 
maintenance was condemned as per se illegal in 1968.124 In 
1967, the Supreme Court applied a per se rule to vertical non-
price restrictions.125 Between 1977 and 2007, all of these per 
se rules were overturned and replaced by assessment under 
the rule of reason.126 This trend toward reducing the number 
of per se rules and increasing the application of the rule of 
reason has important consequences. 
 
123 See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 
(1911), overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 
U.S. 877 (2007). 
124 See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153 (1968), overruled by 
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
125 See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 381–82 
(1967), overruled by Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 
(1977). 
126 See Cont’l T.V., 433 U.S. at 36 (holding that vertical non-price re-
strictions are subject to the rule of reason); State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 3 (hold-
ing that maximum resale price maintenance is subject to the rule of reason); 
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 551 U.S. at 877 (holding that minimum re-
sale price maintenance is subject to the rule of reason). 
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Since vertical agreements to set resale prices and allocate 
markets are subject to the rule of reason, it becomes crucial to 
distinguish them from horizontal agreements allocating mar-
kets or setting prices. For example, if Toyota entered into 
agreements with each of its dealers requiring the dealers to 
sell a Camry for a specified price from a specified location, 
those agreements would be subject to the rule of reason. How-
ever, if two or more Toyota dealers agreed with each other to 
sell Camrys at an agreed upon price or to refrain from locating 
their dealerships near each other, those agreements would be 
per se illegal. 
Therefore, the agreement requirement discussed in the 
previous part is not only important as a threshold element for 
any scrutiny under section 1. It is also important for deter-
mining what type of agreement is present. As in American 
Needle, the existence of one agreement is sometimes easy to 
determine. There it was the contract between the NFL licens-
ing entity and Reebok. That agreement would be vertical in 
nature since it was between a licensor and a licensee of intel-
lectual property. As a vertical agreement, it would be subject 
to the rule of reason. The issue in the case was whether, in 
addition to this vertical agreement, a horizontal agreement 
was also present. The Court determined that the teams were 
separate entities capable of conspiring together. Of course, the 
teams were in a horizontal relationship as potentially compet-
ing licensors of their own trademarks. A horizontal agreement 
that eliminated competition between these potential competi-
tors and gave rise to the agreement with Reebok would be sub-
ject to closer scrutiny under section 1 than the vertical agree-
ment would be standing alone. 
3. The Rule of Reason: Fast and Slow 
Agreements that are not per se illegal under section 1 are 
subject to assessment under the rule of reason. The rule of 
reason involves a potentially complex analysis of the compet-
itive effects of the agreement. Instead of taking a categorical 
approach, the rule of reason attempts to assess the legality of 
an agreement by determining the potential anticompetitive 
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and procompetitive effects of the alleged agreement. This mat-
ter of degree approach avoids the necessity of defining a cate-
gory of illegal conduct. However, the matter of degree ap-
proach does require an assessment of both potential 
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects and netting those 
effects against each other. This process can involve complex 
allocations of burdens at different stages of the assessment. 
The threshold question in a rule of reason case is whether 
the plaintiff has presented enough evidence of anticompetitive 
potential to shift the burden to the defendants to present a 
possible procompetitive justification. In three cases, the Su-
preme Court concluded quite quickly that the plaintiffs had 
met this burden. In National Society of Professional Engineers 
v. United States,127 the defendant association had adopted a 
rule that prohibited its members from engaging in competitive 
bidding. The Court concluded that because the agreement af-
fected prices, the plaintiff had demonstrated the anticompeti-
tive potential of the agreement.128 In NCAA v. University of 
Oklahoma,129 the defendant association had limited the num-
ber of football games that could be broadcast on television. It 
also sold groups of games to broadcast networks for package 
prices. The Court concluded that the agreement had sufficient 
potential for an adverse effect on competition to require the 
defendant to offer a justification.130 Finally, in FTC. v. Indi-
ana Federation of Dentists,131 the defendant association had 
adopted a rule that forbid its members from providing insur-
ance companies with patients’ x-rays when submitting a 
claim. The Court held that such an agreement was potentially 
anticompetitive without an elaborate analysis.132 These three 
cases are examples of a “quick look” approach to the threshold 
 
127 Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
128 Id. at 692. 
129 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 
468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
130 Id. at 113. 
131 FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986). 
132 Id. at 459. 
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question in a rule of reason case. However, not all rule of rea-
son cases are suitable for this quick look approach to that 
threshold question. 
In California Dental Association v. FTC,133 Justice Souter 
and Justice Breyer debated when a quick look approach to the 
threshold question under the rule of reason was appropriate. 
In a five-four split, Justice Souter’s view that a quick look ap-
proach was inappropriate in that case prevailed. The defend-
ant association had adopted a set of rules that appeared to be 
aimed at false advertising by dentists. However, the rules had 
been applied to prohibit advertising prices as low, across the 
board discounts and quality claims.134 The question before the 
Court was whether that finding was enough to shift the bur-
den to the defendant to offer a procompetitive justification. 
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, held that the agency 
had not met its burden of establishing a sufficient likelihood 
of anticompetitive effects to shift the burden to the defend-
ant.135 Justice Breyer disagreed. He argued that the anticom-
petitive potential of the advertising restrictions required the 
defendant to present evidence of procompetitive effects.136 
Determining whether the plaintiff has demonstrated suffi-
cient likelihood of anticompetitive effects is not the only diffi-
cult question in applying the rule of reason. If the plaintiff has 
made the required demonstration, the burden shifts to the de-
fendant to offer a justification for the agreement. This justifi-
cation must focus on the procompetitive effects of the agree-
ment. This requirement proved difficult for defendants in 
some of the cases discussed above. In Professional Engineers, 
the defendant association tried to justify its ban on competi-
tive bidding by arguing that competitive bidding would lead 
to poor quality engineering.137 The Court rejected this defense 
as asserting that competition would lead to negative conse-
quences rather than arguing that the agreement enhanced 
 
133 Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
134 See id. at 783. 
135 Id. at 778. 
136 Id. at 784 (Breyer, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
137 Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693 
(1978). 
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competition, and explained that “the Rule of Reason does not 
support a defense based on the assumption that competition 
itself is unreasonable.”138 Similarly, in Indiana Federation of 
Dentists, the defendants argued that giving the insurance 
companies access to the diagnostic x-rays would lead to nega-
tive results.139 Citing Professional Engineers, the Court re-
jected this argument as an attack on the concept of competi-
tion rather than an argument that the agreement furthered 
competition.140 Finally in NCAA, the defendants argued that 
the agreement restricting the number of games on television 
was necessary in order to preserve ticket sales for live attend-
ance at football games.141 The Court rejected this argument 
since it was based on the assumption that live ticket sales 
could not compete with televised games in the absence of the 
restraint.142 Citing Professional Engineers, the Court rejected 
this argument.143 
In summary, the basic structure of section 1 of the Sher-
man Act is based on three categorical rules backed up by one 
matter of degree rule. The first categorical rule is the single 
entity fiction. The single entity fiction requires that two or 
more entities that meet the requirements of the rule exist. The 
rule is categorical since it attempts to define a set of criteria 
for what is a single entity. It is a fiction since it ignores the 
actual people within each defined entity. The second categor-
ical rule is the requirement that the entities engage in a com-
municated agreement. This rule establishes a parameter that 
excludes interdependent behavior from the definition of an 
agreement. The third categorical rule is the per se rule, which 
renders conduct illegal without regard to its effects. Per se 
rules define sets of agreements that are automatically illegal. 
Each per se rule has its own set of parameters. The back-up 
matter of degree rule is the rule of reason. If conduct is not 
 
138 Id. at 696. 
139 FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 462–63 (1986). 
140 Id. at 463. 
141 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 
468 U.S. 85, 115 (1984). 
142 Id. at 117. 
143 Id. 
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legalized by the single entity fiction or the exclusion of inter-
dependent behavior from the definition of an agreement and 
is not condemned by a per se rule, its competitive effects are 
analyzed by the shifting burdens of the rule of reason.  
The net effect of the combined impacts of these rules is to 
strongly encourage some types of cooperation while strongly 
discouraging other types of cooperation. Cooperation within a 
firm is strongly encouraged, since it is automatically legal un-
der section 1. Similarly, cooperation by interdependence is 
strongly encouraged since it too is automatically legal under 
section 1. However, achieving cooperation through agree-
ments that are subject to a per se rule is strongly discouraged 
since a court will not hear any procompetitive arguments in 
support of such agreements. If an agreement is subject to the 
rule of reason, it is discouraged to the extent that a plaintiff 
will be able to quickly shift the burden to the defendant to of-
fer a procompetitive justification and to the extent that the 
defense arguments are based on asserting that competition is 
itself harmful. 
This discussion of the structure of section 1 lays the foun-
dation for analyzing its application to sharing economy enter-
prises. Part IV undertakes that analysis. 
IV. APPLYING THE SHERMAN ACT TO THE 
SHARING ECONOMY 
The preceding part described the structure of section 1 of 
the Sherman Act. This section will analyze the issues pre-
sented in applying section 1 to sharing economy arrange-
ments. The analysis proceeds by asking four questions. First, 
are the participants in a sharing economy arrangement sepa-
rate firms capable of conspiring for purposes of section 1? Se-
cond, what is the nature of the agreements among these 
firms? Third, are any of these agreements subject to a rule of 
per se illegality? Fourth, how are any other agreements to be 
assessed under the rule of reason?  
These issues are not merely academic. A purported class 
action made up of consumers of Uber’s services has sued Uber 
CEO Travis Kalanick, alleging a horizontal conspiracy be-
tween Kalanick and other Uber drivers to use Uber’s pricing 
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algorithm to fix the price of rides.144 “Plaintiff claimed, in es-
sence, that Mr. Kalanick, while disclaiming that he was run-
ning a transportation company, had conspired with Uber driv-
ers to use Uber’s pricing algorithm to set the prices charged to 
Uber riders, thereby restricting price competition among driv-
ers to the detriment of Uber riders, such as plaintiff Meyer.”145  
Judge Rakoff noted the many features of the Uber enter-
prise that led to the high level of coordination among the driv-
ers, effected through the Uber platform, including the de facto 
lack of individual price negotiation (despite the permissibility 
of downward deviation from algorithmically established 
prices).146 Rejecting Uber’s argument that the Uber driver 
agreements were individual vertical agreements with Uber 
and not a horizontal agreement with one another, the District 
Court noted the historic judicial recognition of hub-and-spoke 
conspiracies in antitrust.147 The District Court denied the mo-
tion to dismiss the claim of a price fixing conspiracy.148 This 
Article considers below how the law of section 1, described in 
detail in Part III, above, should be applied to sharing economy 
enterprises like Uber. 
A. Agreement Analysis 
The threshold question in a section 1 analysis is whether 
the participants in any coordinated behavior are separate en-
tities capable of entering into an agreement under section 1. 
 
144 See Meyer v. Kalanick, 174 F. Supp. 3d 817, 819–20 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
145 Id. at 820. 
146 Id. at 820–21. 
147 Id. at 824 (citing Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 
208 (1939) and United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015)). A 
hub-and-spoke conspiracy is an agreement reached between two or more 
parties who communicate through a common third party (the hub) although 
they may not actually communicate with each other. See In re Disposable 
Contact Lens Antitrust, 215 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1292 (M.D. Fla. 2016). 
148 The application of an arbitration clause in the Uber passenger 
agreement with passengers has recently been analyzed by the U.S. Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals. That court concluded that the arbitration clause 
was valid and enforceable, remanding to the District Court on the question 
of waiver. See Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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When the Supreme Court addressed this question in Copper-
weld, it determined that a parent corporation and its wholly 
owned subsidiary were a single entity for purposes of section 
1.149 When the Court addressed the question of whether the 
teams belonging to the National Football League comprised a 
single entity in American Needle, it reached the opposite con-
clusion.150 In both cases, the Court focused on whether the ac-
tors were pursuing a unified economic interest. “The officers 
of a single firm are not separate economic actors pursuing sep-
arate economic interests, so agreements among them do not 
suddenly bring together economic power that was previously 
pursuing divergent goals.”151 “Although NFL teams have com-
mon interests such as promoting the NFL brand, they are still 
separate, profit-maximizing entities, and their interests in li-
censing team trademarks are not necessarily aligned.”152 
Actors joining in a sharing economy arrangement are each 
pursuing their own separate economic interests and are there-
fore not protected by the single entity fiction. Uber and each 
of its drivers are separate economic actors; some of these ac-
tors might make money while others suffer losses. Uber takes 
a piece of each driver’s revenue but does not share each cost, 
and the drivers share neither revenues nor costs. The same is 
true for Airbnb and each of its property owners.  
1. Types of Sharing Economy Agreements 
Concluding that participants in the sharing economy ar-
rangements are separate entities capable of conspiring under 
section 1 is only the first step in the agreement analysis. The 
next step is determining whether the parties have entered 
into any agreements. Of course, some agreements in sharing 
 
149 See supra text accompanying notes 98–100. 
150 See supra text accompanying notes 101–105. 
151 Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769, 771 
(1984) (“[T]he coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly owned subsid-
iary must be viewed as that of a single enterprise for purposes of § 1 of the 
Sherman Act. A parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete 
unity of interest. Their objectives are common, not disparate . . . .”). 
152 American Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 198 
(2010).  
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economy arrangements are easy to spot. For example, Uber 
drivers enter into express agreements with Uber that contain 
complex terms related to insurance, driving record, nature of 
the vehicle, and payment methods. Similarly, riders agree 
with Uber by accepting terms and conditions when signing up 
for the Uber app.153 These agreements include terms related 
to the nature of the vehicle, locations served, and payment 
methods. Beyond these express agreements, other agreements 
are also possible.  
One might consider the driver and the rider to be in an 
agreement. Under this conception, Uber is providing a match-
ing service. It tells both drivers and riders that it will help 
them find each other and that it will coordinate the terms of 
their deal. This conception of the arrangement characterizes 
Uber as selling a service both to drivers and to riders. It is 
compensated for this service by the difference between what 
the rider pays and what the driver receives. In pure contract 
law terms, identifying an agreement between the driver and 
the rider seems straightforward. The rider sends a trip re-
quest. The driver accepts the request. The terms of the deal 
are set by the Uber terms and conditions of service. These 
agreements are very benign from a Sherman Act perspective. 
Uber is selling a matching service to both drivers and riders, 
and the driver is selling a transportation service to the rider. 
These sale agreements are vertical agreements between con-
sumers and suppliers. Vertical contracts of sale are not anti-
competitive. Rather, they are the basic mechanics of a market 
economy. 
2. Horizontal Agreements Among Suppliers? 
An important question is whether the Uber drivers should 
be viewed as in agreements with one another. Among sharing 
economy enterprises, Uber imposes the most substantial con-
trol over suppliers. When accepting the terms and conditions 
as an Uber driver, each driver is agreeing with Uber. Are they 
also agreeing with one another? From a purely contractual 
 
153 U.S. Terms of Use, UBER (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.uber.com/le-
gal/terms/us/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2017). 
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perspective, the answer seems to be no. The drivers never di-
rectly communicate with one another, and none of the drivers 
make an offer that is accepted by another driver. However, 
this contract law determination does not control the Sherman 
Act question.  
The Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations and 
conspiracies in restraint of trade.154 The concept of a conspir-
acy is not limited to contractually enforceable promises. Fur-
ther, the word “combination” is more commodious than the 
confines of an enforceable contract. The agreement analysis of 
Uber’s coordination of driver activity is similar to, but differs 
from, other well-known agreement contexts. This Subpart 
considers (1) vertical restrictions on distribution, (2) member-
ship organizations, (3) horizontal joint ventures, and (4) joint 
sales agencies. 
a. Vertical Restrictions on Distribution 
One well known context for Sherman Act agreements in-
volves restricted distribution imposed by sellers on reselling 
buyers.155 Sherman Act analysis of restricted distribution by 
the Supreme Court goes back more than a century.156 As dis-
cussed in the previous part, in restricted distribution a sup-
plier tells a buyer where, to whom, and/or at what price the 
buyer may resell. While at various points in history these 
agreements were illegal per se, current law subjects them to 
the rule of reason.157 Vertical agreements about territories, 
customers, or resale price need to be distinguished from hori-
zontal agreements about these same topics. Agreements 
among competitors, horizontal agreements, allocating territo-
ries or customers, or fixing prices are per se illegal.158 Thus, 
 
154 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
155 See supra text accompanying notes 122–125. 
156 See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 
(1911), overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 
U.S. 877 (2007). 
157 See supra text accompanying notes 122–125. 
158 See supra text accompanying notes 114–115. 
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the distinction between vertical agreements restricting distri-
bution and horizontal agreements determines whether the 
agreements are per se illegal or subject to the rule of reason. 
A manufacturer may agree with each of its retailers about 
where, to whom, and for how much the retailers may resell 
the manufacturer’s products, and these vertical agreements 
may be lawful under the rule of reason.159 However, if those 
same retailers agree with each other about any of those topics, 
their agreement is per se illegal. The fact that the manufac-
turer has entered into a set of vertical agreements with its 
retailers by itself does not mean that the retailers are in an 
agreement with each other. Such a horizontal agreement 
would need to be established by other facts.160 
Well-established law permits a plaintiff to prove a horizon-
tal agreement effected by a set of seemingly unilateral vertical 
agreements. In Interstate Circuit v. United States, the Su-
preme Court recognized that a horizontal conspiracy might 
arise through a scheme orchestrated at one level of the chain 
of distribution. This horizontal conspiracy by vertical agree-
ment could arise if the offer was accepted by more than one 
actor at a different level of chain of distribution who recog-
nized that its competitors had also been offered and were ac-
cepting the agreement.161 Plaintiffs made this argument in 
opposition to Uber’s efforts to dismiss the consumer suit alleg-
ing a horizontal conspiracy.162 The Second Circuit recently af-
firmed a finding of liability for an Interstate Circuit-like, ver-
tically orchestrated, horizontal agreement. In Apple e-Books, 
the Department of Justice succeeded in convincing the Dis-
trict Court that Apple, an e-book retailer, had orchestrated a 
price-fixing agreement among e-book publishers.163 The Se-
cond Circuit affirmed, noting the historic acceptance of hub-
 
159 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 551 U.S. at 877; Cont’l T.V., Inc. 
v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
160 See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730 n.4 
(1988). 
161  Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1929). 
162  See Meyer v. Kalanick, 174 F. Supp. 3d 817, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
163 See United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 690–91 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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and-spoke conspiracies that do not necessitate express agree-
ment among horizontal competitors.164  
Sharing economy arrangements do not literally fit the ver-
tical restricted distribution mold. Uber does not sell a good to 
the drivers that the drivers then resell to the rider. Therefore, 
the agreement that the Uber’s drivers all charge the same 
price for the service they sell to the rider does not involve a set 
of vertical resale price maintenance agreements. Rather, Uber 
merely provides a matching service that helps drivers and rid-
ers find one another. The drivers then provide a service to 
their riders at a price established by the Uber algorithm. 
b. Membership Organizations 
Another familiar context for the analysis of agreements un-
der section 1 involves membership organizations. In a line of 
cases that date back to 1918, the Supreme Court has con-
cluded that the members of such an organization are all party 
to an agreement,165 and declined to characterize such ar-
rangements as a set of individual agreements between the or-
ganization and each member. For example, the Court con-
cluded that members of the Indiana Federation of Dentists 
agreed with each other to withhold x-rays from insurance 
companies.166 The Court also concluded that thousands of 
members of the National Society of Professional Engineers 
 
164 See United States v. Apple Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 314 (2d Cir. 2015). 
165 See, e.g., Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). 
166 The relevant factual findings are that the members of the 
Federation conspired among themselves to withhold x rays 
requested by dental insurers for use in evaluating claims for 
benefits, and that this conspiracy had the effect of suppress-
ing competition among dentists with respect to cooperation 
with the requests of the insurance companies. As to the first 
of these findings there can be no serious dispute: abundant 
evidence in the record reveals that one of the primary rea-
sons—if not the primary reason—for the Federation’s exist-
ence was the promulgation and enforcement of the so-called 
‘work rule’ against submission of x rays in conjunction with 
insurance claim forms. 
FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 455 (1986). 
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agreed together to refrain from competitive bidding.167 Simi-
larly, the Court deemed the college members of the NCAA to 
be in an agreement to restrict the number of televised football 
games and establish prices for those broadcast rights.168 The 
Court also viewed an agreement among the physician mem-
bers of the Maricopa County Medical Association to charge no 
more than the prices fixed by the Association as horizontal 
and per se illegal.169 Members of each of these organizations 
agreed to abide by the rules established by the organization. 
Each of these agreements existed among the members and 
were horizontal in nature. 
However, the sharing economy arrangements do not liter-
ally involve membership organizations. Uber is not a club 
with members. It is a seller of a service to both drivers and 
riders, and part of this service is establishing the price that 
the drivers will charge the riders. Unlike membership organ-
izations, Uber drivers are not literally joining a group or 
agreeing to abide by the rules that the group imposes on its 
members.  
c. Joint Ventures 
A third familiar context for the analysis of agreements un-
der section 1 involves joint ventures. In a production joint ven-
ture, two or more firms agree to cooperate in producing a prod-
uct or service. These firms may or may not have been 
 
167 Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) 
(“In this case we are presented with an agreement among competitors to 
refuse to discuss prices with potential customers until after negotiations 
have resulted in the initial selection of an engineer.”).  
168  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 
468 U.S. 85, 99 (1984) (“By participating in an association which prevents 
member institutions from competing against each other on the basis of price 
or kind of television rights that can be offered to broadcasters, the NCAA 
member institutions have created a horizontal restraint—an agreement 
among competitors on the way in which they will compete with one an-
other.”). 
169 Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 356–57 (1982) 
(“The agreement under attack is an agreement among hundreds of compet-
ing doctors concerning the price at which each will offer his own services to 
a substantial number of consumers.”). 
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competitors prior to the formation of the venture. The Su-
preme Court analyzed a production joint venture in Texaco, 
Inc. v Dahger,170 in which two oil companies, Texaco and 
Shell, agreed to combine their gasoline refining assets. The 
joint venture produced and owned the gasoline, which it sold 
under the Texaco and Shell trademarks.171 The plaintiff al-
leged that the agreement constituted per se illegal price fixing 
by competitors. The Court held that the per se rule did not 
apply since the gasoline sold pursuant to the agreement was 
jointly owned by the firms in the venture.172 Essentially, Tex-
aco and Shell shared the profits made from the sale of the gas-
oline that they jointly owned through the venture. The hall-
mark of such a joint venture is that the agreeing parties 
jointly produce a good or service. The sale of this jointly owned 
good or service produces profits (or losses) that are shared by 
the venturers.  
In a sharing economy arrangement, the agreeing suppliers 
do not jointly produce a good or service that they jointly sell. 
Rather, the agreeing suppliers jointly market goods or ser-
vices separately produced by the suppliers—for example, each 
individual Uber driver provides rides to separate riders. There 
is no joint production of the underlying service. Some individ-
ual Uber drivers may make profits while other drivers may 
suffer losses. 
d. Joint Sales Agencies 
Perhaps most analogous to a sharing economy arrange-
ment is a joint sales agency. In Appalachian Coals v. United 
States,173 a group of coal companies formed a corporation to 
act as their sales agent. The agent had authority to set the 
prices at which the coal was sold.174 The Court treated this 
agreement as existing among the coal companies.175 Although 
 
170 Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006). 
171 See id. at 4. 
172 Id at 8. 
173 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1984). 
174 Id. at 358. 
175 Id. at 364. 
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this arrangement is broadly analogous to sharing economy ar-
rangements, there are distinctions. For example, Uber drivers 
did not form and do not own Uber. Instead, Uber is a separate 
company seeking its own profits. However, it is unclear 
whether this distinction should make a difference. Each driver 
knows that there are other drivers simultaneously agreeing 
with Uber. Uber tells each of the drivers that all of the drivers 
will be charging the price determined by the Uber algorithm. 
Each driver agrees to this arrangement.  
In summary, the Uber arrangement seems more analogous 
to the organization cases and the joint sales agent cases than 
the joint venture cases or the vertical restriction on distribu-
tion cases. Unlike a joint production venture, Uber and its 
drivers do not jointly own the production produced by their 
coordinated behavior. Unlike a vertical restriction on distri-
bution, Uber does not produce something that is then resold 
by its drivers. Like the organization cases, drivers agree to 
common terms governing each of their conduct. And like the 
joint sales cases, drivers produce the service that is then mar-
keted and priced by Uber. This tends to indicate that the Uber 
drivers are in an agreement with each other. A horizontal 
agreement among suppliers in a sharing economy enterprise 
raises the possibility of a determination of per se illegality or 
quick look treatment under the rule of reason. The following 
Subparts consider these possibilities.” 
B. Is the Uber Arrangement Per Se Illegal? 
Concluding that Uber drivers are in an agreement with 
each other is the first step in analyzing the potential applica-
tion of the per se rule against horizontal price fixing. The next 
step is determining whether that agreement results in the 
drivers all charging the same price. As discussed in Part II, 
the current Uber terms and conditions make the price deter-
mined by the Uber algorithm a “default” price. However, Uber 
has not implemented any mechanism through which the driv-
ers can conveniently inform riders of their willingness to ac-
cept less (or demand more) than the “default” price. When a 
driver accepts a trip request and arrives to pick up a rider, 
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there is no incentive for the driver to accept less than the “de-
fault” price. Therefore, the agreement between Uber and each 
driver leads to price uniformity. If, as discussed in the prior 
Subpart, the drivers are in an agreement with each other, that 
agreement leads to the same price uniformity. 
If Uber drivers are deemed to be in an agreement with each 
other to price according to the Uber algorithm, this has poten-
tially profound consequences.176 Agreements among competi-
tors about prices are ordinarily per se illegal.177 Such a con-
clusion would make Uber’s entire business model a violation 
of section 1, giving rise to treble damage remedies and, theo-
retically, criminal exposure.178  
1. The Scope of the Per Se Rule 
Although courts have most frequently applied the per se 
rule against price fixing by competitors to classic cartels, they 
have also applied the rule to less patently anticompetitive con-
duct. For example, the rule was articulated in United States 
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., where there was no express agree-
ment over a set price.179 In Socony-Vacuum, the Supreme 
Court faced an agreement by major oil companies to coordi-
nate purchases from independent refiners to remove what the 
defendants believed was excess production from the mar-
ket.180 The Court upheld the criminal conviction of the defend-
ants, stating that “[u]nder the Sherman Act a combination 
formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depress-
ing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in 
 
176 See Nowag, supra note 3. 
177 See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 
(1940). 
178 Section 1 violations all carry the potential for criminal penalties. As 
a matter of practice and the application of prosecutorial discretion, however, 
criminal penalties are almost exclusively sought in the context of what are 
termed “hard core cartels”—agreements to fix price or output or to divide 
markets that are formed in secret. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN-
TITRUST DIVISION MANUAL IV–12 (5th ed. 2017). 
179 Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 150. 
180 Id. at 167. 
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interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se.”181 In Arizona 
v. Maricopa County Medical Society, the defendant organiza-
tion of doctors promulgated maximum fees schedules that the 
defendants asserted lowered the price of medical care.182 The 
Supreme Court applied the per se rule to this agreement de-
spite its alleged price reducing effects.183 In Catalano, Inc. v. 
Target Sales, Inc., the defendant beer wholesalers allegedly 
agreed that they would demand payment at or prior to deliv-
ery to their retailer customers.184 Prior to this alleged agree-
ment, the defendants sometimes accepted payment several 
weeks following delivery.185 The Court of Appeals held that 
this agreement was not subject to the per se rule against price 
fixing. The Supreme Court reversed in a per curium holding, 
“It is virtually self-evident that extending interest-free credit 
for a period of time is equivalent to giving a discount equal to 
the value of the use of the purchase price for that period of 
time. Thus, credit terms must be characterized as an insepa-
rable part of the price.”186 These cases demonstrate little tol-
erance for horizontal agreements affecting prices. 
The Supreme Court has declined to apply the per se rule in 
some situations in which competitors have agreed to fixed a 
price. In NCAA v. University of Oklahoma,187 the defendant 
association of universities sold broadcast rights for football 
games to television networks and fixed the prices for those 
broadcast rights.188 The Court did not apply the per se rule 
despite the horizontal price fixing agreement, emphasizing 
that the context required some form of horizontal cooperation. 
“[W]hat is critical is that this case involves an industry in 
which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the 
 
181 Id. at 223. 
182 Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 342 (1982). 
183 Id. at 348. 
184 Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 644 (1980). 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 648. 
187 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 
468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
188 Id. at 99–100. 
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product is to be available at all.”189 Uber might argue that the 
same is true in its situation. To the extent that its drivers are 
deemed to be in an agreement with each other, Uber might 
argue that at least some form of horizontal cooperation is nec-
essary for the ride service to be offered to consumers through 
its app.190 
2. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS 
In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, competing copyright hold-
ers agreed together to pool their copyrights and offer licensees 
a blanket license to all of the copyrights in the pool.191 The 
defendants were required by a prior consent decree to accept 
only nonexclusive licenses to the copyrighted music.192 This 
preserved competition among the copyright holders in licens-
ing individual copyrights. Of course, when the defendants of-
fered the blanket license created by their agreement to cus-
tomers, they needed to set a price for the blanket license. 
Thus, the defendants were a group of competitors who got to-
gether and agreed to fix a price. The Court held that this 
agreement was not per se illegal, and reasoned that the de-
fendants were not fixing the price of anything that they could 
individually create and sell.193 Instead, the defendants were 
creating something new and selling it in competition with 
their other individual offerings. “But the blanket license can-
not be wholly equated with a simple horizontal arrangement 
among competitors. ASCAP does set the price for its blanket 
license, but that license is quite different from anything any 
individual owner could issue. The individual composers and 
 
189 Id. at 101. 
190 There are reports of off-platform coordination among Uber drivers 
designed to manipulate the surge pricing algorithm. By jointly logging out 
of the Uber app. during peak use times, drivers can cause the surge pricing 
algorithm to kick in and increase the amount paid for rides. See generally 
Le Chen et al., Peeking Beneath the Hood of Uber, FTC (Sept. 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2015/09/ 
00011-97592.pdf [perma.cc/JKX8-JRX8]. 
191 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 5 (1979). 
192 Id. at 11. 
193 Id. at 23. 
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authors have neither agreed not to sell individually in any 
other market nor use the blanket license to mask price fixing 
in such other markets.”194  
The implications of BMI for Uber and similar enterprises 
are complex and important. Whether the suppliers in a shar-
ing economy enterprise like Uber engage in horizontal price 
fixing subject to the per se rule or produce a previously un-
known product or service, invoking the rule of reason, may be 
determinative of the viability of these enterprises. The Uber 
arrangement has introduced a new set of suppliers to the mar-
ket. Uber’s agreements with both drivers and riders allow 
drivers to offer rides in a way not previously practicable. It 
adds capacity to the marketplace, exerting downward pres-
sures on prices in markets previously served only by regulated 
taxis. However, it is a leap to conclude that the Uber enter-
prise creates something that the individual drivers could not 
produce on their own. Any individual ride is provided by one 
driver for one price. Unlike BMI, the rider is not purchasing 
unlimited rides from a group of drivers for a single fee. Uber 
drivers are not cooperating to create a bundle of rides to be 
purchased by a rider. A single ride is something that a single 
driver could theoretically offer to a rider. On the other hand, 
that single driver could not realistically find the rider who 
wants that particular ride without a matching company like 
Uber, and Uber could not offer that service without agree-
ments with multiple drivers. 
3. The Ancillarity Doctrine 
BMI can be characterized as an application of a body of law 
called the ancillarity doctrine. The doctrine was set forth by 
William Howard Taft when he was a judge on the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in U.S. v. Addyston Pipe & Steel 
Co.195 At the time, courts were struggling with how to incor-
porate a reasonableness requirement into section 1 analysis 
without allowing cartelists to argue that the price they had 
 
194 Id. at 23–24. 
195 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 
1898). 
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fixed was reasonable.196 Then Judge Taft offered the ancillar-
ity doctrine as an analytical tool to solve this problem. He held 
that restraints of trade should be lawful if they reasonably 
furthered the purposes of a lawful contract.197 He explained, 
for example, that a covenant not to compete would be lawful 
if it was reasonably ancillary to the sale of a business.198 Of 
course, the price fixed by a cartel is not ancillary to any other 
lawful contract, and would thus be illegal. BMI is an easy case 
under the ancillarity doctrine. The copyright holders agreed 
together to create the blanket license. The challenged price 
agreement merely put a price on this new product. The blan-
ket license could not be sold without a price. Therefore, the 
agreement to create the price was reasonably ancillary to the 
lawful purpose of introducing the blanket license to the mar-
ket.  
If the ancillarity doctrine is applied to the sharing economy 
arrangements, some outcomes are easy and some are more an-
alytically challenging. Airbnb imposes restrictions on its prop-
erty owners regarding health and safety, disclosure of various 
characteristics of the property, a customer review regime, and 
antidiscrimination rules. All such agreements can be de-
fended as reasonably ancillary to the lawful purpose of match-
ing renters with property owners. Airbnb does not impose a 
pricing agreement on its property owners. Similarly, Uber 
drivers agree to a series of contract terms that seem reasona-
bly ancillary to the lawful purpose of matching drivers to rid-
ers. These include terms related to insurance, driving record, 
nature of the vehicle, and method of payment. However, the 
tougher question under the ancillarity doctrine is whether the 
agreement to charge the price determined by the Uber pricing 
algorithm is reasonably ancillary to the matching service pro-
vided by Uber. 
The reasonableness of the connection between a price 
agreement and lawful contractual purpose varies by context. 
In BMI, the contractual purpose of selling the blanket license 
 
196 See e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 
290 (1897); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898). 
197 Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 282. 
198 Id. at 281. 
ANDERSON & HUFFMAN – FINAL 
No. 3:859] SHARING ECONOMY MEETS THE SHERMAN ACT 913 
could not be accomplished without the price agreement. If 
Airbnb property owners agreed about the price of their rental 
properties, such an agreement would not be reasonably ancil-
lary to the matching service offered by Airbnb. Renters using 
Airbnb often book their reservations days, weeks, or months 
in advance. They have plenty of time to consider various prop-
erties prior to booking. This comparison involves location, 
property type, size, amenities, and, of course, price. Property 
owners compete regarding all of these aspects of the transac-
tion. The context of Uber transactions is different. First, the 
rides offered by Uber drivers are more uniform than proper-
ties offered by Airbnb owners. Most importantly, all of the 
competing Uber drivers are offering a ride to and from the 
rider’s selected locations. Second, the Uber rider is booking 
their ride much closer in time to the provision of the driving 
service. Third, the Uber booking process is very quick.  
Do the temporal aspects of the Uber transaction make the 
pricing agreement reasonably ancillary to the matching ser-
vice? Reducing the number of variables contributes to the 
speed of negotiating a contract. When a consumer purchases 
a carton of milk in the checkout line of a grocery store, very 
few contract terms need to be individually negotiated. The 
transaction takes place very quickly. When a commercial ten-
ant rents an office building, many terms need to be individu-
ally negotiated. The transaction takes more time. Eliminating 
price competition among Uber drivers contributes to the speed 
of the matching transaction. However, that does not neces-
sarily make the agreement to charge the same price reasona-
bly ancillary. Price competition is at the core of a market econ-
omy. That centrality is the reason for the per se rule against 
price fixing. An argument that price competition needs to be 
eliminated faces a high hurdle. 
4. Fast Sharing Economy Transactions Without 
Price Fixing 
Could the matching service provided by Uber be accom-
plished while maintaining price competition among Uber driv-
ers? Theoretically, a rider could solicit offers from Uber driv-
ers after identifying the starting and ending points of the 
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desired ride. Uber drivers could engage in an online auction 
to identify which driver is willing to offer the ride for the low-
est price. This auction could be limited to a short period of 
time. If this process is practical, then the agreement to charge 
the price specified by the Uber algorithm would not be reason-
ably ancillary to the matching service provided by Uber. On 
its face, the practicality of such an auction seems doubtful. 
The prospect of Uber drivers generating competing bids, pos-
sibly while driving, seems awkward at best. However, it may 
be possible to simplify the process without agreeing to abide 
by the Uber algorithm price. The bidding process would be 
much simpler if the price determined by the Uber algorithm 
was just the starting point for the negotiation.199 Drivers 
could then bid by offering percentage discounts off (or in-
creases above) the Uber algorithm price. Drivers could decide 
in advance that they would always bid a certain percentage 
below (or above) the Uber algorithm price. Presumably this 
discount (or surcharge) could be specified in advance by each 
driver and automated into the bidding process. Under these 
conditions, the bidding process might be rapid and relatively 
painless. If that is so, the current agreement to charge the 
price determined by the Uber algorithm would not be reason-
ably ancillary to the provision of the matching service, and the 
per se rule against horizontal price fixing would apply. 
C. If the Uber Arrangement Is Not Per Se Illegal, Who 
Bears What Burdens Under the Rule of Reason? 
It is possible that Uber may succeed in avoiding the appli-
cation of the per se rule against horizontal price fixing. If so, 
the rule of reason would apply. As discussed in Part III, the 
application of the rule of reason requires the shifting of bur-
dens between the plaintiff and the defendant on three ques-
tions.200 The plaintiff bears the initial burden of demonstrat-
ing the likelihood of anticompetitive effects. If the plaintiff 
establishes that likelihood, the burden shifts to the defendant 
 
199 The authors are grateful to Professor Benjamin Cover for this sug-
gestion. 
200 See supra text accompanying notes 127–143. 
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to present a procompetitive justification. If the defendant does 
so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the an-
ticompetitive effects outweigh the procompetitive effects. 
The agreement among Uber drivers to charge the price de-
termined by the Uber pricing algorithm creates a sufficient 
likelihood of anticompetitive effects that the plaintiffs could 
quickly meet their burden on the threshold question. A hori-
zontal agreement regarding price is as likely to have anticom-
petitive effects as the agreements in the three cases where the 
Supreme Court quickly determined that the plaintiffs met 
their initial burden. In Professional Engineers, the Court 
quickly concluded that the association’s rule prohibiting com-
petitive bidding was sufficiently likely to be anticompetitive 
that the defendants needed to offer a procompetitive justifica-
tion.201 In Indiana Federation of Dentists, the Court quickly 
concluded that the agreement to refuse to supply x-rays to the 
insurance companies was similarly likely to be anticompeti-
tive and similarly required a justification from the defend-
ants.202 Finally, in NCAA, the Court held that the associa-
tion’s agreement to limit the number of televised games and 
determine a price for packages of games was sufficiently likely 
to have anticompetitive effects that the plaintiff had carried 
their burden on the initial question under the rule of rea-
son.203 An agreement among Uber drivers regarding the price 
to charge riders is similarly likely to have anticompetitive ef-
fects. Such a conclusion would shift to Uber the burden of pre-
senting a procompetitive justification. 
Faced with this burden, Uber would offer the procompeti-
tive effects of the entry into the market for rides that its app 
creates. However, the difficulty for Uber would be linking 
these procompetitive effects to the agreement on price. The 
massive entry of drivers into the ride market is of course sig-
nificantly procompetitive. However, Uber would bear the bur-
den of establishing a causal nexus between the procompetitive 
 
201 Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 694–95 
(1978). 
202 FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986). 
203 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 
468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984). 
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effects of entry and the agreement on price. In NCAA, the 
Court addressed a similar issue. The association argued that 
creating a balance of athletic talent among teams served a 
procompetitive interest of enhancing the quality of the prod-
uct it offered.204 The Court agreed.205 However, the Court con-
cluded that there was no logical connection between this pro-
competitive effect and the restriction on television broadcasts 
that the association adopted.206 Therefore, the presence of a 
procompetitive effect justifies a restraint on competition only 
if there is a logical nexus between the procompetitive effect 
and the restraint. The procompetitive effects of the market en-
try resulting from the Uber app would justify the price agree-
ment only if there was a logical nexus between the entry and 
the price agreement. Uber bears the burden of establishing 
this nexus. The possibility of this nexus might be enough to 
justify avoiding the application of the per se rule against price 
fixing. However, like in NCAA, the possibility might exist, but 
when the defendant is called upon to establish the presence of 
the nexus rather than its mere possibility, the defendant 
might fail. 
If Uber succeeded in establishing the logical nexus be-
tween the price agreement and the market entry facilitated by 
its app, the burden would shift back to the plaintiff to show 
that the anticompetitive effects outweigh the procompetitive 
effects. If the procompetitive entry logically depended on the 
price agreement, the plaintiff would not be able to successfully 
bear this burden. In such a case, the market entry would not 
occur without the price agreement. The price agreement thus 
limits only competition that would not occur at all in the ab-
sence of the agreement. 
 
204 Id. at 117. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. at 117–19. 
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V. LESSONS FOR THE STRUCTURE OF A 
SHARING ECONOMY ENTERPRISE 
Part IV shows that when applying black-letter antitrust 
law to different sharing economy enterprises, the terms im-
posed by different platforms influence the antitrust treat-
ment. The primary analysis in Part IV discusses the Uber 
platform and its terms of service, including the de facto no ne-
gotiation price term. It concludes, first, that those terms and 
conditions lead to a horizontal agreement among the drivers 
regarding price. Second, the possibility that price identity is 
required for the Uber system to work makes per se treatment 
inappropriate. Third, under a quick look version of the rule of 
reason, Uber would be required to establish such a logical 
nexus between the price identity agreement and the efficiency 
of its system. 
In this Part, this Article provides a novel structure for an-
alyzing the antitrust standard to apply to a sharing economy 
enterprise.207 Subpart A establishes a comprehensive frame-
work for distinguishing among sharing economy enterprises 
based on two variables: the degree of sharing of risk among 
the actors and the extent and subject matter of the coordina-
tion among them. Subpart B draws generalizable lessons for 
sharing economy enterprise structure. 
A. Diagramming Section 1 Conduct 
The approach stated here is more willing than traditional 
antitrust law to treat both sets of variables as matters of de-
gree rather than categorical rules. Regarding the degree of 
risk-sharing, current antitrust law treats the “single entity” 
question as a binary distinction.208 A single entity is exempt 
from scrutiny under section 1, while multiple entities are sub-
ject to the application of section 1 when they agree with each 
 
207 The analysis here is likely generalizable to non-sharing-economy 
enterprises. We postpone that generalization to another article. 
208 See Mark Anderson, The Enigma of the Single Entity, 16 U. PA. J. 
BUS. L. 497, 507–08 (2014) (discussing the rule of per se legality for intra-
firm agreements). 
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other. This existing categorical approach leaves sharing econ-
omy enterprises subject to the full range of section 1 assess-
ment since actors within such enterprises do not share profits 
and losses to such an extent that they meet the categorical 
approach of existing antitrust law. 
Current antitrust law also imposes categorical rules re-
garding the extent and subject matter of the coordination 
among actors.209 Some types of coordination among some 
types of actors are illegal per se. This Article argues that such 
categorical distinctions are inappropriate when applied to 
sharing economy enterprises. Rather, the extent of coordina-
tion should be viewed as a matter of degree and compared to 
the extent of risk-sharing. Even price fixing among competi-
tors may be acceptable if the degree of risk-sharing is suffi-
ciently extensive. 
 Figure 1 graphically portrays the interaction of two varia-
bles: coordinated behavior and risk-sharing.210 Coordination 
of behavior by potentially competing economic actors threat-
ens the efficiency that competition promotes. Section 1 sub-
jects coordinated actions to scrutiny because of this threat. On 
the other hand, risk-sharing by economic actors has the po-
tential to promote efficiency. At the extreme of risk-sharing, 
the single entity fiction protects some forms of coordinated ac-
tions from section 1 scrutiny. Although the single entity fic-
tion is nominally addressed to the conduct element, it is based 
on the likelihood of procompetitive effects. The sharing of prof-
its and losses that is at the core of the single entity fiction in-
centivizes the maximization of revenues and minimization of 
costs (i.e., economically efficient behavior). Risk-sharing short 
of complete sharing of profits and losses may also promote eco-
nomic efficiency. Sharing economy enterprises involve varying 
amounts of risk-sharing and varying levels of coordination. 
 
209 See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 
(1979). 
210 The graph is more than a sliding scale of pricing restrictions. The 
primary contribution of this Part is illustrating and providing intuition as 
to the interplay between the pricing control variable and the risk-sharing 
variable. 
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The point of this Article is that antitrust law should allow in-
creased levels of coordination when a sharing economy enter-
prise involves increased levels of risk-sharing. This Article ex-
plains the graph in detail before plotting the locations of 
leading sharing economy enterprises based on an assessment 
of their contract terms with suppliers in Subpart B.  
 
FIGURE 1: RISK-SHARING VS. COORDINATION 
1. X-Axis: Degree of Coordination 
The X-axis represents the degree of coordination among 
the constituent parts of the particular enterprise. At the ex-
treme end, where X approaches infinity, coordination among 
the constituent parts is complete and relates to the most com-
petitively sensitive matters. At the junction with the Y-axis, 
where X approaches 0, coordination is reduced and the sub-
jects of coordination become less competitively sensitive. 
With regard to activity taking place on the X-axis, where 
Y=0, there is no sharing of risk between the constituent parts 
of the enterprise—the parts are in competition and gain no 
efficiency from their coordination. Thus, at the far left end 
where (X,Y)=0, there is perfect competition among individual 
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firms each pursuing their own best interest without regard to 
other firms. In economics textbooks, this is frequently re-
flected in a market for commodities, such as wheat, with at-
omistic producers and consumers, ease of entry and exit, and 
perfect information.211 
Moving to the right on the X-axis (Y=0, X>0), the degree of 
coordination increases, requiring an analysis of the degree of 
harm from the observed conduct. A small X represents harm-
less coordination. Real world examples might include compet-
ing firms’ sharing information that is not competitively sensi-
tive or sharing past information that has been rendered 
anonymous.212 Such exchanges of information are unlikely to 
lead to any harmful marketplace effects. In practical terms, a 
plaintiff bringing a rule of reason case alleging conduct with 
small X will be unable to bear its burden of proving likelihood 
of harm, and a defendant will be able to rest without its own 
demonstration of procompetitive effect.213 
Beyond the very minimal coordination, as Y=0 and X in-
creases, enterprises are subject to higher scrutiny, which 
leads to the quick look rule of reason.214 When enterprises 
lack any risk-sharing among their constituent parts but in-
volve coordination on competitively sensitive matters, plain-
tiffs will increasingly be able to demonstrate harm and even-
tually rely on the presumption of harm provided by the quick 
look rule.215 Such a presumption arises, for example, when 
distinct firms providing dental care, not sharing risk, reach an 
agreement not to provide x-rays to insurers.216  
 
211 See generally ROBERT PINDYCK & DANIEL RUBINFELD, MICROECONOM-
ICS (7th ed. 2014).  
212 See, e.g., Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass’n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 
586 (1925). 
213 See supra Part III (discussing the burden shifting under the rule of 
reason). 
214 Since Cal. Dental, this has been understood to be a sliding scale ra-
ther than a binary rule-of-reason versus per-se distinction. See Cal. Dental 
Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999) (“an enquiry meet for the case”). 
215 See id. at 787–84 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (labeling “obvious” and not 
“possible to deny” the anticompetitive tendencies of private agreements not 
to advertise discounts). 
216 See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454–55 (1986). 
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Finally, when the coordination touches on matters like 
price, output, and product or geographic markets, which are 
forbidden subjects of competitor coordination, it becomes sub-
ject to rules of per se illegality. Examples include an agree-
ment among service providers to divide geographic markets217 
and an agreement among electronic book publishers to raise 
the retail price of e-books.218 Cartel conduct, giving rise to 
criminal enforcement, exists at the extreme right end of the 
X-axis.219 The X-axis thus reflects a progression from no coor-
dination, passing through innocent coordination on harmless 
matters and risky coordination, and eventually reaching 
highly anticompetitive coordination among wholly unin-
tegrated entities. 
2. Y-Axis: Sharing of Risk 
The Y-axis represents the degree of risk-sharing among the 
constituent parts of the particular sharing economy enter-
prise. At the end where Y approaches infinity, the constituent 
parts are engaged in full sharing of profits and losses and are 
acting as a single firm.220 At the junction with the X-axis, 
where Y approaches 0, sharing of risk is reduced to the point 
at which the constituent parts are engaged in vigorous com-
petition. Increased risk-sharing is an indicator of increasing 
likelihood of efficiency. When an enterprise is comprised of in-
dependent competitors, incentives to maximize profits and 
minimize losses across the entire enterprise are lacking. In-
creased risk-sharing within the enterprise incentivizes in-
creased efficiency; at the extreme end of risk-sharing, full 
sharing of profits and losses, formerly independent competi-
tors, are fully invested their mutual success. Thus, as Y ap-
proaches infinity otherwise independent competitors may be 
 
217 See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607–08 
(1972). 
218 See United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 339 (2d Cir. 2015). 
219 See, e.g., United States v. Andreas, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1054 (N.D. 
Ill. 1998) (upholding a jury verdict on price fixing conviction for the Archer 
Daniels Midland executive). 
220 Anderson, supra note 208 (defining single firm after American Nee-
dle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183 (2010)). 
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treated as a single firm that is immune from antitrust scru-
tiny.221 For example, fast food franchises and their common 
franchisor have been treated as a single entity, although each 
pursued its own economic interests.222 
With regard to activity taking place along the Y-axis when 
X=0, there is no coordination between the constituent parts of 
the enterprise. Thus, at the point Y=0, the market is in a state 
of perfect competition. As Y increases, there is an increase in 
risk-sharing among the constituent parts. At the extreme end, 
where Y approaches infinity, risk-sharing is complete and the 
constituent parts are sharing profits and losses. At that point, 
increased coordination is also extremely likely. If actors agree 
to share risk, they are also likely to coordinate their activities. 
This coordination could take the form of shared and equal con-
trol, like in a partnership. It could also take the form of cen-
tralized management accompanied by fiduciary duties, as in a 
corporation.223  
 
221 See Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1147 
(9th Cir. 2003) (“The single-entity rule is relevant in a variety of contexts. 
It applies to a company and its officers, employees and wholly owned sub-
sidiaries.”). Cf. American Needle, Inc., 560 U.S. at 191 (“concerted action 
under § 1 does not turn simply on whether the parties involved are legally 
distinct entities”); PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 
LAW ¶¶ 1466–1467 (3d ed. 2010) (explaining that parent and non-wholly-
owned subsidiaries can be accorded single firm treatment). The District 
Court in In re Term Commodities Cotton Futures Litig., 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 145955, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014), recognized that Copper-
weld’s bright-line rule did not accommodate all circumstances of risk-shar-
ing among firms that might provide a basis for making a single entity de-
termination. “[W]hen lower courts are faced with the question of whether 
an affiliated, but not wholly owned, corporation can conspire with its parent 
in violation of § 1, they must draw from the analysis in Copperweld without 
the benefit of a bright line rule.” Id. at *13.  
222 Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nevada, 794 F. Supp. 1026, 1031 (D. Nev. 
1992), aff’d, 999 F.2d 445, 447 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). 
223 Holding X at 0, the likelihood that an enterprise will exist decreases 
as Y increases. It is unlikely that firms will exist at a point where X=0 and 
Y is significantly greater than 0. Any such risk-sharing would be economi-
cally suspect in the absence of increased coordination of activities. Examples 
might be found in industries in which competing firms independently adopt 
a new input into their manufacturing process in the hopes that the new 
input reflects “the future” of the industry. Such an input might include a 
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3. The Line (X,Y)=0 to (X,Y) →∞: Perfect 
Competition to Single Entity 
The graph in Figure 1 reflects a 45-degree line extending 
from (X,Y)=0 to (X,Y)→∞. At a high level of generalization, 
that line divides conduct that is likely to be a section 1 viola-
tion from conduct that is unlikely to present an antitrust con-
cern. All conduct that is illegal per se or subject to a quick look 
rule of reason analysis lies significantly below and to the right 
of the line. All conduct undertaken by a single entity, which is 
therefore immune from antitrust scrutiny, lies above and to 
the left of the line. 
Conduct that lies near this line is ambiguous as to its an-
titrust treatment. It is subject to the rule of reason, reflecting 
the existence of both (1) potential competitive harm and (2) 
potential efficiency benefits. As conduct deviates from the line 
to the upward and leftward, there is a greater degree of risk-
sharing and a lesser degree of coordination. As the efficiency 
incentives of risk-sharing increasingly overbear the potential 
for competitive harm from coordination, conduct moves into 
an antitrust safety zone. A non-sharing economy example of 
conduct that would diagram to the upper left of the line is 
standard-setting behavior. Firms may coordinate on conduct 
 
new technology, such as electric power in automobiles or touch screens in 
smartphones. It might include a new manufacturing process, such as robot-
ics. Or it might include a new location, such as restaurants and shops that 
make bets on a community’s future economic development. These examples 
of investment based on independent hope, which happens to be shared 
among many, reflect the closest approximations of risk-sharing without co-
ordination among the participants. Of course, in all of these examples, coor-
dination may exist. Technology adoption can occur through standard-set-
ting and joint research and development; manufacturing processes can be 
the subject of trade association discussions; investments in geography can 
be incentivized by states or localities seeking to encourage local develop-
ment. The lightly shaded triangle in the upper left corner of Figure 1 reflects 
the extreme unlikelihood of complete sharing of profits and losses among 
individuals or atomistic firms without coordination of their activities. This 
would be a hypothetical single firm that fails to engage in coordination 
among its constituent parts. A firm in that triangle would be engaged in 
compete risk-sharing with no coordination. It is likely that any such firm 
would not exist for long. 
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that is highly competitively sensitive, like a decision to cease 
competing on innovation, but because standard setting re-
flects a joint commitment to the success of the standard, it re-
flects motion upward on the Y-axis and is generally permitted 
by antitrust law.224 
As conduct deviates from the line to the downward and 
rightward, there is a lesser degree of risk-sharing and a 
greater degree of coordination. This presents increased con-
cern for harm to competition outweighing the efficiency incen-
tives of risk-sharing. A non-sharing economy example of con-
duct to the lower right side of the line is an agreement among 
credit card issuers not to compete against their joint venture 
card network by entering into agreements with a third party 
card network.225 Such an agreement is not illegal per se, be-
cause it does not reflect an agreement on matters of extreme 
competitive sensitivity, but it does reflect coordination in ex-
cess of the risk-sharing among the parties to the agreement. 
The direction of the line demonstrates that as risk-sharing 
increases, the degree of coordination among constituent parts 
of an enterprise that will be tolerated also increases. At the 
extreme end where (X,Y) approaches infinity, a single firm 
may engage in the same conduct that would be illegal per se 
were it engaged in by a set of competitors. 
B. Graphing Exemplar Sharing Economy Enterprises 
Sharing economy enterprises like TaskRabbit involve little 
more than fees paid for matching services and back-office sup-
port, facilitating transactions between providers and consum-
ers. In the absence of agreements on competitively sensitive 
transaction terms, these enterprises easily survive a rule of 
reason inquiry. Platforms like Uber and Lyft control many of 
the transaction terms including price, which is commonly con-
sidered the most competitively sensitive term. As shown 
 
224 See 15 U.S.C. § 4302 (dictating that the rule of reason standard ap-
plies to “standards development organization[s]”). 
225 See United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 242 (2d Cir. 
2003). 
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above, these enterprises warrant quick look scrutiny under 
section 1.226  
Sharing economy enterprises in between those extremes 
are subject to the section 1 rule of reason, an “enquiry meet 
for the case.”227 Justice Souter’s phrase reflects the reality 
that the rule of reason is a sliding scale, where the more com-
petitively sensitive the contract terms involved, the greater 
the attention paid to the enterprise. With Uber and TaskRab-
bit as the extremes, it is possible to assess the sharing econ-
omy enterprise structure in relative terms. The closer in form 
to Uber, the more searching the rule of reason analysis. For 
instance, Lyft (with its established, but alterable, price terms) 
is close to Uber-level scrutiny, while Airbnb (with its minimal 
control over transaction terms) is closer to the hands-off ap-
proach accorded to TaskRabbit. This rule of reason inquiry, a 
 
226 It helps to reproduce here Table 1 from Part II of this Article. See 
supra Part II, at 13. 
Table 1 (reproduced) Uber Lyft ABB CS TR 
Establishes a price for the service 
or product provided 
X X  X  
Controls the method of payment 
over the platform 
X X X  X 
Maintains a functionality for prod-
uct or service reviews 
X X X X X 
Sets minimum requirements for 
the supplier’s personal or real 
property used in the transaction 
X     
Sets requirements meant to en-
sure compliance with accessibility 
and other civil rights laws 
X     
Disclaims control over suppliers, 
including their manner of perform-
ing a service or providing a prod-
uct 
X X    
Collects taxes imposed by a partic-
ular locality 
  X   
Ensures that realistic alternative 
means exist for suppliers to reach 
consumers 
  X  X 
 
227 Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999). 
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matter of degree rather than a categorical distinction, re-
quires substantial judicial inquiry into the competitive sensi-
tivity of the subject of the agreement. 
However, this is only half of the analysis. In Part III, the 
Article also shows that a single firm may engage internally in 
a broad range of agreements on the most competitively sensi-
tive terms without even having its behavior assessed under 
section 1.228 By definition, sharing economy enterprises are 
not single entities.229 The limits of the Coasean definition of a 
firm in a world of hyper-efficient transactions, described in 
Part II, suggest that the doctrinal single entity analysis is not 
sufficiently nuanced. This Article therefore treats the single 
entity concept in a sharing economy enterprise as an “enquiry 
meet for the case,” rather than a binary distinction.230 After 
judging the competitive sensitivity of a particular set of coor-
dinating agreements defining an enterprise, it is necessary to 
judge the degree of risk-sharing among the suppliers. At the 
extreme of risk-sharing, if, for example, an enterprise is de-
termined actually to employ its suppliers, the enterprise be-
comes a single firm and is immune from scrutiny. Short of sin-
gle entity treatment, high levels of risk-sharing justify high 
levels of coordination. 
The antitrust treatment of sharing economy enterprises 
becomes apparent when they are placed on the Figure 1 graph 
on the basis of (1) the extent and nature of the coordination 
among the constituent parts of the enterprise and (2) the de-
gree of risk-sharing involved in the enterprise. Using Figure 
2, below, to depict these relationships, this Subpart considers 
the placement of the leading examples from Part II and what 





228 See supra Part III. 
229 See supra Part II. 
230 The traditional single entity analysis is binary, turning on the shar-
ing of profits and losses or lack thereof. See Anderson, supra note 213, at 
527–28.
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• Uber (and Lyft); 
• Airbnb (and Couchsurfing); and 
• Task Rabbit. 
Location on the graph is an imprecise determination. How-
ever, Figure 2, below, reflects likely placements for these ex-
amples. The remainder of this Subpart explains this judgment 
with respect to each firm. 
 
FIGURE 2: PLATFORM PLACEMENT ON RISK-SHARING/ 
COORDINATION GRAPH 
1. TaskRabbit 
TaskRabbit is a sharing economy enterprise that exists 
well in the antitrust safety zone because of the near lack of 
coordination among its suppliers. Table 1231 shows coordina-
tion on only two factors: the manner of making payment and 
the collection and dissemination of reviews of quality and re-
liability for the participants on the platform. Neither present 
serious competitive concerns. For example, if two plumbers 
(suppliers of services of the sort marketed through the 
TaskRabbit platform) reached an agreement to create a joint 
 
231 Table 1, supra note 226.  
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venture to process payments or to advertise their respective 
consumer satisfaction, the rule of reason scrutiny would be 
minimal. Operating through the TaskRabbit platform adds ef-
ficiency to any such coordination while in no way adding to 
the competitive concern. The TaskRabbit enterprise therefore 
maps to a low point on the X-axis, below all of the other exam-
ples and nearly in the zone of antitrust irrelevance.232 
2. Uber 
Uber presents the greatest concern for coordination and 
lowest likelihood of efficiency produced by risk-sharing among 
the constituent parts of the enterprise. Coordination in the 
case of Uber occurs on a matter of maximum sensitivity—the 
price charged for the services provided. Uber’s coordinating 
conduct is so concerning that it would be per se illegal price 
fixing if there was no risk-sharing. 
Using the coordination versus risk-sharing paradigm, the 
Uber enterprise escapes such per se condemnation because of 
the degree of risk-sharing among the drivers. Suppliers on the 
Uber platform are mutually invested in the platform’s success, 
without which they are individually unable to produce a taxi 
like service that is appealing to consumers. That is for at least 
three reasons. First, in the absence of the platform, which in 
turn can only exist at substantial scale, suppliers do not have 
a realistic means of matching their services with the demand 
for one-off ride hailing.233 Second, the platform, operating at 
scale, permits the creation of reliable reputations through op-
 
232 The TaskRabbit enterprise also maps to a relatively low Y. 
TaskRabbit suppliers operate in industries that are traditionally populated 
by small firms or sole proprietorships. Plumbers, painters, builders, and 
handymen frequently market their services on an individual basis, using 
traditional marketing channels. In most cases, TaskRabbit likely serves as 
little more than an additional marketing channel and an efficient payments 
provider. The platform’s success or lack thereof is likely not sufficiently 
meaningful to affect the success, or lack thereof, of its suppliers. 
233 Less successful examples of unregulated taxi service include appeal-
ing to arriving passengers at airports. Those efforts fail to produce a mean-
ingful market for unregulated taxis. 
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portunities to rate suppliers. Third, the platform permits reg-
ulatory disruption by achieving sufficient scale and public ap-
peal to discourage its being subjected to potentially harmful 
regulatory interference. 
Uber drivers are strongly invested in the success of the en-
terprise, a degree of risk-sharing that should move the enter-
prise far enough along the Y-axis to escape per se condemna-
tion. Under a quick look rule of reason analysis, the Uber 
enterprise would be required to show the benefits to competi-
tion stemming from its enterprise structure before a plaintiff 
would be required to show net harm. This conclusion is con-
sistent with the classical approach to analyzing Uber, de-
scribed in Part IV, with one analytical difference. Under the 
classical approach, Uber’s procompetitive argument would 
hinge on the logical nexus between the price identity agree-
ment and the efficiency of the Uber operating model.234 Under 
the approach suggested here, Uber’s procompetitive argument 
would be that the competitively sensitive level of coordination 
is justified by the likelihood of efficiencies incentivized by the 
level of mutual risk-sharing.235 
 
234 See supra text accompanying notes 195–202. 
235 Lyft follows a similar business model to Uber. However, there has 
historically been an important difference: the Lyft app explicitly permits 
tipping. Tipping permits price negotiation above an established floor. Uber’s 
move to add a tipping function to its app eliminates this disparity going 
forward. In the presence of tipping, the apps increase competition among 
drivers for consumer dollars above the price floor. However, a tipping option 
does not eliminate the competitive concern. In the absence of risk-sharing, 
the Lyft agreement would still be treated as illegal per se. The pricing var-
iability tipping introduces merely moves Lyft closer to zero on the X-axis. 
Lyft takes advantage of the precise risk-sharing that the Uber enterprise 
involves: suppliers are invested in the enterprise’s success. The Lyft enter-
prise is subject to rule of reason treatment, likely less “quick” than its com-
petitor Uber. It is possible that a plaintiff challenging the Lyft agreement 
under section 1 will need to show an upward effect on prices before Lyft 
would bear the obligation to demonstrate the efficiencies flowing from the 
enterprise structure. 
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3. Airbnb 
Airbnb maps to the lightly shaded “safety zone” on Figure 
2. This reflects the reality that the coordination in the case of 
Airbnb is largely limited to matters that are not competitively 
sensitive. These include the manner of advertising, manner of 
collecting payment, and requirements agreed to by service 
providers on the Airbnb platform including insurance and lia-
bility for loss. The X-axis location for Airbnb is substantially 
lower than that for either Uber or Lyft, both of which include 
agreements on price, the matter of primary competitive sig-
nificance. An agreement among competitor lodging services—
for example, between the hotel chains Hilton and Sheraton—
to jointly advertise or create a billing and collections service 
organization would be subject to full blown rule of reason 
treatment. Under that approach, the plaintiff would not be 
able to quickly shift the burden to the defendant to present a 
procompetitive justification. 
Determining the appropriate antitrust treatment for 
Airbnb also requires a consideration of the degree of risk-shar-
ing among the suppliers on the platform. Airbnb suppliers are 
invested in the platform to a degree similar to Uber and Lyft 
suppliers. Like Uber drivers, Airbnb suppliers have alternate 
means to market their properties, including word of mouth, 
local rental agencies, and early-mover Vacation Rentals by 
Owner, a platform not unlike Airbnb but less aggressive in 
expansion and less effective in moving to mobile technol-
ogy.236 Airbnb suppliers also depend heavily on reliability rat-
ings, not unlike Uber suppliers, for whom consumer trust is 
paramount. The regulatory disruption benefit of the platform 
is nearly a precise match to Uber; only at sufficient scale and 
public investment in the platform can Airbnb avoid poten-
tially crippling regulatory interference in its operations. Hold-
ing Y constant between the two firms, but decreasing X to re-
flect non-sensitive matters of coordination in the case of 
 
236 See VACATION RENTALS BY OWNER, http://www.vrbo.com 
[perma.cc/FH4R-SFZG]. 
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Airbnb, moves the enterprise to the lightly shaded “safety 
zone.”237 
C. Summary 
This Part states a more nuanced approach to determining 
how section 1 should be applied to a particular sharing econ-
omy enterprise. Drawing on the understanding that the shar-
ing economy enterprise disrupts the Coasean firm, Part V 
treats the question of whether an enterprise is a single entity, 
and thus achieves the efficiencies of integration, as a sliding 
scale from minimal risk-sharing to complete sharing of profits 
 
237 Lesser known competitor “Couchsurfing” is a scaled back version of 
Airbnb that allows comparable variability in listings. As distinct from 
Airbnb, however, Couchsurfing imposes an agreed maximum price, set at 
zero. Neither consumers nor suppliers may negotiate transaction terms that 
involve an exchange of money for lodging. Intuition suggests that the only 
effect of a zero price is to maintain prices lower than in its absence. How-
ever, antitrust law is clear that horizontally agreed maximum prices are as 
pernicious as horizontally agreed minimum prices. Both interfere with the 
price setting mechanisms of the free market by preventing individually ne-
gotiated transaction terms. As illustrations of the possible harm from the 
Couchsurfing agreement, the effect of a zero price may be to discourage 
quality improvements for which consumers of Couchsurfing services would 
gladly pay. It may discourage would-be competitors from joining the plat-
form or even forming a competing platform, with the effect of reducing the 
quantity of lodging services supplied. This counterintuitive result may sug-
gest a more comprehensive rethinking of section 1 standards as applied to 
sharing economy firms. Couchsurfing suppliers are less coordinated on 
other aspects of their providing services. The terms of service do not involve 
a centralized payment mechanism. The zero-price agreement does not nec-
essarily mean there could be no centralized payment system. Couchsurfing 
could take credit cards for damage deposits or as a means to improve relia-
bility ratings. They do not involve tax collection services. In sum, Couchsurf-
ing involves an agreement on a highly sensitive transaction term, the price, 
but avoids agreement on a number of other transaction terms. It maps on 
the X-axis to a point above Airbnb but below Uber and Lyft. On the Y-axis, 
Couchsurfing maps below previous examples. The value of reliability rank-
ings and matching services is consistent with Airbnb and, like Airbnb, pos-
sibly greater than Uber and Lyft. The regulatory disruption value of the 
platform, protecting its suppliers from regulatory interference, is not an is-
sue in a fee-free arrangement. 
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and losses. Mapping sharing economy enterprises to the ap-
propriate point on the Y-axis is one step in the analysis. The 
second step is to map the enterprises to the X-axis, based on 
the extent and competitive sensitivity of the coordination they 
impose. This analysis offers the promise of broad application 
across the sharing economy. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article tackles the challenge of applying antitrust 
law, now more than 125 years old, to the most modern of en-
terprise structures—the sharing economy enterprise. The dif-
ficulty is not small, as traditional concepts such as horizontal 
versus vertical agreements and single entity versus combina-
tions of separate entities do not map well to the sharing econ-
omy. And this difficulty is not merely hypothetical. Current 
litigation challenging the most well-known sharing economy 
firm, Uber, has the potential to be momentous in nature. The 
court has already held that the plaintiffs pleaded a horizontal 
agreement. If the court were to decide that this agreement 
was illegal per se, Uber would be forced to make a meaningful 
alteration to its basic structure. Alternatively, if the court 
were to decide that the agreement was subject to the quick 
look rule of reason, Uber would be charged with the burden of 
demonstrating meaningful procompetitive benefits and the 
relevance of the complained-of pricing term to those benefits. 
This Article also shows that every sharing economy enter-
prise has terms of service that might, in theory, be challenged 
as a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. While not all of 
these terms approach the competitive sensitivity of an agreed 
price term, many, including those that specify the methods of 
payment or the type and quality of the products or services 
provided, do reflect agreements on matters that directly affect 
consumer choice and welfare. However, these terms of service 
enable sharing economy enterprises to succeed. They allow 
consumers to form expectations about what they are buying 
and how much it will cost—just like buying from a traditional 
business firm—while benefiting from a large set of small sup-
pliers. The interaction between these consumers and small 
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suppliers is made possible only by the sharing economy enter-
prise.  
This Article advocates accommodating the innovative 
structure of the sharing economy enterprise by altering anti-
trust analysis. Courts should assess the degree to which con-
stituent parts of sharing economy enterprises (1) share eco-
nomic risk and (2) coordinate their behavior on competitively 
sensitive matters. Charting the degree of risk-sharing in rela-
tion to the degree of coordination on competitively sensitive 
matters permits a determination of the appropriate antitrust 
treatment. The process advocated here is more appropriate to 
the disruptive enterprise structure that defines the sharing 
economy.  
 
